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Abstract   
Evaluation of a given system‟s effectiveness has numerous pitfalls.  System objectives 
may be poorly defined, may shift during the system life, or may be hard to quantify.  
Further, individual perceptions of the quantifications may differ.  Whatever the cause, 
system effectiveness has been an elusive term to quantitatively define.  This research 
posits a quantitative system effectiveness model and establishes a utilitarian approach 
for use with an illustrative application to n operating nuclear safeguards system.   
 
The Department of Energy (DOE) defines domestic safeguards, which are applied to 
nuclear material as; “an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting, 
and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to 
unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of nuclear materials.”   
 
This research includes the investigation of the utility coefficients and simulation of a 
domestic nuclear safeguards system, as well as simulation of an airport passenger 
screening system consisting of: an identification screening system; an X-ray system for 
checking bags and computers; and a walk through metal detector.   
 
Expert judgment was used to determine the relative importance (utility) of the individual 
subsystems through a statistically analyzed web survey.  The survey population is 
nuclear material protection, control, accounting, and plant management experts.  The 
mean utility coefficients determined during the survey were applied to the system 
components developed assigned randomly generated values of component 
effectiveness and combined to produce an overall system effectiveness.  Simulated 
Type I and Type II error rates are used for illustration of the probabilistic methodology 
currently used by DOE (calculating protection effectiveness) and the posited and 
heuristically based methodology (system effectiveness).  Use of the heuristically based 
system effectiveness methodology illustrates an approach that combines the subsystem 
components of plant management, physical protection, material accounting, and 
material control for a domestic safeguards system.  The system effectiveness 
methodology is complimentary to and more robust than the protection effectiveness 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Assessing the effectiveness of existing systems is essential for making decisions 
relative to the allocation of resources needed to ensure and support the efforts of the 
system.  Greater demands are being placed on systems to respond to user 
expectations in a cost-efficient manner.  Even greater demands are placed on the 
information produced and used in making decisions which often have long-term 
consequences.  This is especially true of systems whose purpose is detection.  This is 
truer still when detection is part of a Protection/Security system. 
 
In the current era of world-wide terrorism, effectiveness of Protection/Security systems 
takes on increased importance.  Since September 11, 2001, the American public has 
become acutely aware and concerned about security from terrorist acts; and they 
expect the government to provide that security.  Today‟s Protection/Security systems 
are expected to perform effectively against all types of threats (e.g. materials, 
chemicals, physical forces, electronic attack). 
A looming threat is the use of nuclear materials to cause massive destruction; and this 
calls for measures to safeguard the public‟s well-being.  The Department of Energy 
(DOE) defines domestic safeguards, which are applied to nuclear material as; “an 
integrated system of physical protection, material accounting, and material control 
measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, 
use, or sabotage of nuclear materials.”  The public expects this system to be effective. 
System Effectiveness  
Assessing the success and effectiveness of today‟s complex systems is an increasingly 
challenging problem.  “Demands for increased performance, lower system life cycle 
costs, longer operating capacities and improved productivity and efficiency must be 
balanced against limited resources, scant and sometimes unknown data, the 
identification and resolution of conflicts and problems, and resource allocation.” [1]  That 
was true twenty years ago when Habayeb made that statement, and it is still true today.  
Thus, what is needed is a systematic approach for identifying problem areas and 
assessing system effectiveness. 
 
In the current environment of national security, a system‟s level of effectiveness takes 
on increased importance.  Given the recent incidents of terrorism abroad, international 
security needs highlight the importance in assessing the effectiveness of systems that 
are required by both national and international bodies.  The United Nations (UN) 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 states that inter alia States (Countries) 
shall: “take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, 
 
 2 
including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end 
shall: (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and 
secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; and (b) Develop and 
maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;” [2]  A central theme of this 
resolution is “effective measures”.  Having measures is necessary; but they are not 
sufficient for providing security unless they are effective. That sufficiency creates 
confidence in the international safeguards concerning nuclear activities and promotes 
world peace. Without confidence, the commitment to non-proliferation may be 
weakened by fear and mistrust.  
 
The burden of designing, building, and maintaining systems with effective measures is 
placed on the member States of the UN; however, there is no mutually agreed upon list 
of what these measures should be or how their effectiveness should be determined.  
Systems engineers, then, are needed to assist in such efforts.  Systems engineers will 
be charged with evaluating the effectiveness of these, often complex and integrated, 
systems and to begin that activity, they need a definition for effectiveness.  
Lack of Overall System Effectiveness Methodology 
Given the level of concern about having effective security systems in  this post- 9/11 
environment and the usefulness of information they provide in decision making, it is 
surprising to find a lack of cohesive and accepted methodologies used to address their 
overall system effectiveness in the open literature.  Soban and Mavris detail the lack of 
a System Effectiveness Methodology and much of the following section closely 
corresponds to their analysis [3].  There are a multitude of systems modeling tools, and 
the creation, use, and improvement of these tools is a flourishing endeavor [4]. In 
addition, many decision makers and analysts use these tools in their own individual 
way.  However, finding information specifically detailing overall methodologies is 
difficult. There are several possible reasons for this lack of obvious resources.  These 
reasons, which correspond to those described by Soban and Mavris [3] are detailed 
below. 
Methodology or Framework  
Merriam-Webster defines a methodology as: “a body of methods, rules, and postulates 
employed by a discipline; or: a particular procedure or set of procedures” and 
framework as “a basic conceptional structure (as of ideas).” [5]  From these definitions, 
a framework is more conceptual and a methodology is more defined and has more 
rigor.  The Microsoft Corporation in discussing the “Best Practices For IT Solutions 
Success”, describes a framework as being similar to a compass that can give guidance 
along a journey and a methodology as a specific set of directions to a specific location. 
[6] 
 
As part of the Global Text Project (http://globaltext.org/), the information systems (IS) 
community has looked at IS methodologies and notes that a methodology is usually 
defined as “a holistic approach to the problem-solving process and the word „method‟ is 
a subset of a methodology.  Methodologies in general are viewed as problem-solving 
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processes, to solve mainly ill-structured problems.  Problems where the solution and the 
outcome is not easily predictable i.e. having high uncertainty.  Methodologies provide 
users with the means to reflect on reality, determine the problems and solving them.  To 
sum up, methodologies provide users with ways of thinking, doing and learning. 
Methodologies provide users with ways to approach the problem and controlling the 
process of solution development. They provide an appreciation of standards and they 
enforce a more disciplined and consistent approach to planning, developing and 
managing.” [7]   
Difficulty Assessing Government and Classified Material 
Originally, system effectiveness studies were confined to military and space systems.  
Agencies of the US Government such as the Department of Defense (DOD) or the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were the ultimate customers.  
With these agencies as customers, the available literature on system effectiveness and 
the accompanying models were published primarily as technical reports, but rarely 
appear in widely published journals. [8]  Today‟s analysts appear to have new interest in 
system effectiveness studies using campaign modeling, especially in the area of 
technology infusions.  However, much of this work is classified or proprietary, limiting 
accessible publications and information.  Finally, those non-government agencies that 
do make advances in theater modeling and system effectiveness may find it necessary 
to keep their in-house methods proprietary in order to retain their competitive edge.  
Because of these restrictions, some fundamental contributions to this field are not 
available to appear in this body of research. 
System of Systems or Family of Systems Approach 
In order to successfully formulate a system effectiveness methodology, it is imperative 
to clearly define the system and its components.  Given that most systems are part of 
larger systems (making them subsystems), the question becomes the relationship 
between those subsystems.  This represents an expanding progression of what is 
considered the system.  Two fundamental types of aggregate systems are: a System of 
Systems; and a Family of Systems.  The definition of these types of aggregate systems 
does not have consistency across the industry.  Of particular importance in the analysis 
of the system is independence and interoperability. 
 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(DoD-ATL) defines a system of systems as: 
“A key principal to the understanding of a “system-of-systems” is the notion that a 
system performs a function not possible with any of the individual parts acting 
alone.  Thus, a system can be viewed as any organized assembly of resources 
and procedures united and regulated by interaction or interdependence to 
accomplish a set of specific functions.  In this context, a “system-of-systems” can 
be viewed as a set or arrangement of interdependent systems that are related or 
connected to provide a given capability.  The loss of any part of the system will 
degrade the performance or capabilities of the whole.”[9] 
This is in contrast to their definition of a family of systems, which is: 
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“a set or arrangement of independent (not interdependent) systems that can be 
arranged or interconnected in various ways to provide different capabilities.  The 
mix of systems can be tailored to provide desired capabilities dependent on the 
situation.  …..  Thus, interoperability of the independent platforms is a key 
consideration in the ad hoc deployment of a „family-of-systems‟”[9] 
The above definitions are in contrast to others who have indicated a system of systems 
as being independent but interoperable. [10]  However, the key point in this research is 
the assumption that the subsystems of the example system are independent and they 
are interoperable.  Using the DoD-ATL definition the assumption is that a safeguards 
system is a Family of Systems. 
Quantification 
The key word in the definition of system effectiveness is “quantification”.  In order for the 
decision maker or designer to evaluate the system, the results of the analysis must be 
presented as quantifiable metrics.  This involves restating a research goal or design 
decision into a question that can be answered quantitatively. Dixon [11] states this 
explicitly: “An engineering analyst must begin by defining quantitatively answerable 
questions”. Mathematical methods, thus, become primary tools in system analysis 
because of their ability to rapidly provide these calculable (quantifiable) metrics. In 
addition, mathematical modeling allows the user to understand and make informed 
decisions at various levels within the system hierarchy. With the “system of systems” or 
“family of systems” concepts comes an appreciation of the potential complexities and 
interactions involved. Mathematical modeling offers significant benefits: “There are 
many interrelated elements that must be integrated as a system and not treated on an 
individual basis. The mathematical model makes it possible to deal with the problem as 
an entity and allows consideration of all major variables of the problems on a 
simultaneous basis”. The challenge is in determining what elements to model and how 
to model the relationships among them. 
 
Thus, what is needed is a methodology that addresses the above – one that  
(a) Provides a clear definition of a system and system effectiveness that is broad 
across many applications; 
(b) Complements the probabilistic approach (DOE approach of PE) 
(c) Adds to the open literature concerning systems effectiveness measurement; and 
(d) Recognizes the complexities of system structures; and 
 
It is the mission of this research to do just that, and show how it applies to Safeguards 
Systems for nuclear materials.  The framework of the work is that of a family of systems.   
Safeguards Goals 
The document that was developed to detail the safeguards obligations of states that are 
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), INFCIRC/153, provides a technical 
definition of the safeguards objective, namely "the timely detection of the diversion of 
significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful activities...and deterrence of 
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such diversion by the risk of early detection." The key terms of this objective were not 
defined in INFCIRC/153; this task was given to the Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) of the IAEA, an advisory group of technical 
safeguards experts.  SAGSI considered the problem of quantifying the safeguards 
objective for several years. It identified four terms appearing either explicitly or implicitly 
in the statement of the objective just quoted as in need of quantitative expression. 
These were: significant quantities, timely detection, risk of detection, and the probability 
of raising a false alarm. It defined the associated numerical parameters (significant 
quantity, detection time, detection probability, and false alarm probability) as detection 
goals. Where: 
 
A significant quantity (SQ) was defined as "the approximate quantity of nuclear 
material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion process involved, 
the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded."  
The detection time (the maximum time that should elapse between a diversion and 
its detection) should be of the same order of magnitude as conversion time, defined 
as the time required to convert different forms of nuclear material to the components 
of a nuclear explosive device.  
On the basis of common statistical practice, SAGSI recommended a detection 
probability of 90-95%, and a false-alarm probability of less than 5%.  
 
It seems rational that the detection goals should be operational criteria for safeguards 
effectiveness. In particular, a diversion of less than a significant quantity would not 
provide enough material for a nuclear explosive, and with regard to timely warning, it 
would obviously be advantageous to know about a diversion in time to do something 
about it, that is, before the diverter could assemble a weapon from the diverted material. 
[12] 
1.2  Significance of Safeguard Systems 
The Nuclear Safeguards community in the world is divided into two communities or 
communities of practice (CoP). Those CoPs are focused either on domestic safeguards 
or international safeguards.   
 
The domestic safeguards CoP can be represented by the United States Department of 
Energy (DOE) which defines safeguards in numerous DOE orders [13] as; “an 
integrated system of physical protection, material accounting, and material control 
measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, 
use, or sabotage of nuclear materials.”  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of 
the United States includes two major areas (Physical Protection and Material Control & 
Accounting) in its description of domestic safeguards [14].  Therefore, the NRC 
definition is consistent with the DOE definition.  Typically organizations involved with 
domestic safeguards are legally responsible for the control and accounting of the 




The international safeguards CoP can be represented by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) which is a subsidiary organization to the UN.  The IAEA defines 
Safeguards as “a set of activities by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a State is living 
up to its international undertakings not to use nuclear programs for nuclear weapons 
purposes. The safeguards system is based on assessment of the correctness and 
completeness of the State‟s declarations to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and 
nuclear-related activities.”[15]  It should be noted that the physical protection component 
is absent from this definition, so at its heart, international safeguards consist of 
verification of appropriate accounting and control for nuclear material.   
 
The IAEA guidelines for effective safeguards are that the IAEA can detect the diversion 
of a significant quantity (e.g. 8 kg plutonium of 25 kg of highly enriched uranium), with a 
90% probability, within a specified 'conversion time' (related to the time required to 
convert different forms to metal) and with a false-alarm rate of no more than 5%. [16] 
 
The international safeguards community verifies a State‟s declarations of nuclear 
material inventories.  Under these circumstances, effectiveness has a different 
emphasis and is not further developed in this research; however, the domestic 
Safeguards Systems effectiveness techniques developed would be applicable (with 
appropriate subsystems and components to the subsystems) to international use.   
 
The modeling of domestic safeguards is assumed the most useful to the system 
manager and, as such the safeguards definition chosen for this research is for the 
domestic safeguards system, and the unmodified term “safeguards” hereon refers only 
to domestic safeguards.   
 
In the specific case of nuclear safeguards, the system studied is one designed to 
safeguard nuclear material stored in a secure location (hereon referred to simply as a 
safeguards system).   
 
Figure 1 is an image of the table listing the nuclear materials identified by DOE [17].  
Similarly the identification of nuclear materials as special nuclear material (SNM) as 
defined by NRC is: (1) plutonium, uranium 233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 
in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission, pursuant to the 
provisions of section 51 of the act, determines to be special nuclear material, but does 
not include source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the 
foregoing but does not include source material. [14] 
 
Physical protection is required of SNM at all times, but the level of physical protection 
measures (such as guards, gates, fences, etc.) required is determined using a graded 
approach that is dependent on the category (I, II, III, IV) and attractiveness (A, B, C, D, 









Figure 2 Image of DOE Graded Safeguards Table 
 
Areas with different levels of access are illustrated by an example facility and can be 
seen in Figure 3.  In this case there are four levels of access which are consistent with 
DOE terminology.  The lowest level access in this example is the property protection 
area (PPA) and access is gained through pedestrian portal 1.  The next level of access 
in this example is the limited area (LA) and access is gained through pedestrian portal 
2.  Both of these pedestrian portals are equipped with keypad entry devices which can 
automatically check an individual‟s credentials and allow access.  Another level of 
access can be a protected area (PA), with access in this case through guard station 3, 
where a guard can verify access credentials.  And finally there is a material access area 
(MAA) with access through guard station 4.  Each level of access has a discrete access 
list allowing only those with a recognized need to enter.  The specific security measures 
for each of these types of areas is determined by the attractiveness and category of the 
material in the MAA with category 1 material having the most stringent security 
measures.  The access control system is a vital system for safeguards effectiveness. 
 
Regarding accounting, a facility has an accounting system for tracking SNM inventories; 
documenting SNM transactions; issuing periodic reports; and assisting with the 
detection of unauthorized system access, data falsification, and material gains or 
losses. The accounting system provides a complete audit trail for all SNM from receipt 
through disposition. 
 
Thus, the effectiveness measure of safeguards subsystems is vital information for both 





Figure 3 Example of Graded Access 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In summary, there exists a need in the Safeguards CoP for an integrated and 
systematic methodology that can assess an operating safeguards system‟s 
effectiveness. This methodology will be used to aid the decision maker in resource 
allocation, trade studies between system components, and requirements definition.  The 
inherent presence of uncertainty in such a process has in the past necessitated the use 
of a detailed probabilistic analysis environment, facilitated through the use of 
mathematical modeling.  A heuristic methodology that takes established subsystem 
performance rates and combines them in a way to establish a single system 
effectiveness measure would be a useful advancement in systems analysis.  The 
heuristic measures of effectiveness proposed for this research are Type I (false 
positive) and Type II (false negative) errors. These needs give rise to specific research 
questions A and B and Hypotheses 1 and 2: 
 
A. Can a methodology be formulated and used to analyze the effect of incorporating 
measures of effectiveness at the component-subsystem level, yet assess the 
overall effectiveness at the system level? 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) methodology is a 
valid approach to incorporate safeguards measures of effectiveness at the 





B. Can uncertainties, such as incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties in the modeling environment be addressed through heuristics in a 
system effectiveness methodology? 
 
Hypothesis 2: Calculating safeguards system effectiveness using Type I 
and Type II error rates is a valid modeling approach upon which to base an 
effectiveness methodology with incomplete data, rapidly changing 
technologies, and uncertainties.   
1.4 Summary and Introduction of Remaining Chapters 
Measuring a system‟s effectiveness to date has not been a straight forward process.  
Up to the present time, one has to develop the framework in which the evaluation will be 
conducted and determine what type of measures of effectiveness will be used with no 
agreed or common performance-based methodology for how to determine an overall 
system effectiveness.  Domestic nuclear safeguards systems are particularly important 
systems which need continuous evaluation of performance.  A methodology to 
determine a system‟s effectiveness in near real time, with modern computing power, will 
give facility and systems managers a greater capability to mitigate the risks associated 
with threats to materials and essential services.   
 
The remainder of this research addresses the concerns previously stated and follows a 
structured approach in addressing them.  Structurally, the relevant literature with 
respect to system effectiveness and safeguards systems in particular are presented in 
Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 contains the research methodology: 1) development of the 
function or calculating system effectiveness; 2) an explanation of the web-based survey 
design to find the utility coefficients; and 3) the construction of the simulations used to 
validate the effectiveness calculation.  The research results are presented and analyzed 





Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of the literature relevant to the research 
undertaken and discusses the research questions and hypotheses.  It includes basic 
system theory, approaches to effectiveness and applicable effectiveness theory, prior 
work related to effectiveness, the specific safeguards application issues including a 
discussion of risk, a discussion on utility theory, and finally safeguards facility scenarios. 
2.1 Systems Theory 
There are many possible definitions of a system; however, there is general agreement 
across fields and disciplines as to what constitutes a system. The following definition is 
representative of this agreement: 
 
A system may be considered as constituting a nucleus of elements combined in 
such a manner as to accomplish a function in response to an identified need…A 
system must have a functional purpose, may include a mix of products and 
processes, and may be contained within some form of hierarchy [18] 
 
Currently the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines a 
system as: “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more 
stated purposes.”[19] This research uses the INCOSE definition as a working definition.  
 
There is also much discussion in the literature concerning what is meant by 
effectiveness.  The MIT Engineering Systems Division defines effectiveness as the 
ratio of functions achieved to the totality of functions desired and efficiency as the ratio 
of functions achieved to the resources used. [20]  Using this definition the common term 
“cost effectiveness” is shown to be an efficiency.   
 
The definitions of system effectiveness vary widely and are often application 
dependent.  Some examples that illustrate the diversity of system effectiveness 
definitions include: 
 
“The probability that the system can successfully meet an operational demand within a 
given time when operated under specified conditions” [21] 
 
“A measure of the degree to which an item can be expected to achieve a set of specific 
mission requirements, and which may be expressed as a function of availability, 
dependability and capability” [22] 
 
Tillman, et. al. in an annotated bibliography on system effectiveness models in 1980 
concluded “A wide range of definitions, and measures of system effectiveness are used 
without strong guiding logic.” [8]. 
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NASA defines effectiveness as “a quantitative measure of the degree to which the 
system‟s purpose is achieved”. [23]  
 
Noel Sproles [24] says that effectiveness is the answer to the question of “Does this 
meet my need?”  He then defined Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) as “standards 
against which the capability of a solution to meet the needs of a problem may be 
judged. The standards are specific properties that any potential solution must 
exhibit to some extent. MoEs are independent of any solution and do not specify 
performance or criteria”. [25]  
 
Finally, system effectiveness holds different meanings for different communities and 
applications. Some organizations tailor their definitions and methods to apply to very 
specific problems.  In addition, system effectiveness is often associated with other 
concepts, such as “operations research”, “industrial engineering”, and “systems 
analysis”.  However, even these have specific approaches and definitions; hence, 
finding “the” definition of system effectiveness is difficult.  A new, consistent definition 
for system effectiveness, therefore, is necessary and must be justified by identifying key 
elements crucial to a useful definition.  First, the term “effectiveness” implies that some 
sort of quantification needs to occur.  This quantification must necessarily be the result 
of systematic analysis of variables and metrics that represent the system performing its 
function. In addition, in order to perform the quantification, an intended or expected 
effect needs to be identified in order to properly model the results of the system 
performance. Combined, these concepts result in the following definition for use in 
formulating the assessment of system effectiveness: 
 
 
System effectiveness is a quantified measure of achievement, through 
functional analysis , of the expected system results.[3] 
 
 
The above will be the working definition of system effectiveness used for the remainder 
of this dissertation and subsequent research. 
 
Another useful definition is: "A system is a purposeful collection of interrelated 
components that work together to achieve some objective" [26], which is an earlier 
variant of the INCOSE definition of “a combination of interacting elements organized to 
achieve one or more stated purposes.” [19].  These definitions are basic to systems 
theory.  A generalized representation of a system is shown in Figure 4 and as shown a 
system exists to respond to a demand placed on it by an entity in its environment (the 
input).  It is the response that entity which usually decides the degree to which its 
demand was met; that is, whether the system was “effective” in meeting its intended 








be resolved when attempting to define and measure system effectiveness. Some of 
them are: 
 dealing with a system as part of a system (or family) of systems;  
 the need to combine both quantitative and qualitative measures; and 
 the relationship between performance measures and effectiveness measures 
and how to aggregate them for the entire system.   
According to Smith and Clark, [28] many approaches for mapping performance 
measures to effectiveness measures are inadequate, especially as systems become 
more networked and complex in behavior.  To overcome the shortcomings of traditional 
approaches to measuring effectiveness, it is critical to measure system effectiveness 
relative to the system domain and purpose and to provide a comprehensive value.  The 
purpose of this research is to respond to that need. 
 
Systems theory grew as a reaction to the generally accepted practice in the early part of 
the 20th century of analyzing systems only as the sum of their parts.  General systems 
theory evolved by considering the characteristics of whole systems and their overall 
outcomes. [29]  In every case a specific system is described specifically and has 
discrete boundaries and interactions with the system‟s environment.  A system can be 
broken into sub-systems each with a discrete function (e.g. a radio that has a receiver 
subsystem, a signal processing subsystem and a speaker subsystem) or aggregated 
into super systems (a system of systems or a family of systems) to produce a combined 
effort to supply a solution to a more complex need (e.g. a transportation system: that 
includes a baggage handling system, a passenger handling system, a food delivery 
system, and an overall system management system).  Systems allow for actions caused 
by actors that may come from outside the system (or from within the system) but can 
have interactions with the system.  The actors are users of the system and often called 
entities.  The level of interactions among the internal and external entities impacts the 
complexity of the system. According to Rouse [30], the complexity is a function of the 
purpose, or intention, of the system. In Table 1 a categorization of some possible 




Table 1 System Intentions 
Intention Example 
Classification “It‟s an instance of type S.” 
Explanation “It‟s type S because ….”  
Prediction “It‟s future output will be Y.”  
Control “If input is U, it‟s output will be Y.”  
Detection “It‟s output is not Y, but should be.”  
Diagnosis “It‟s output is not Y because …”  
 
 
This research will look at systems whose intention is to detect anomalies. Such systems 
specifically, safeguard systems are addressed; and a case study of a related security 
system (airport security system) is presented. 
 
According to Smith and Clark [28], measures of effectiveness (MoEs) should have the 
following properties:  
1. The measure needs to increase as effectiveness increases; 
2. The measure needs to be bounded above by an ideal system and 
bounded below by zero for non-compliance;  
3. To manage complexity and allow for system decomposition, any measure 
needs to represent and support system decomposition and aggregation (for 
equivalent systems aggregate measures must be equivalent regardless of 
level of decomposition). 
4. To facilitate comparisons between systems (which may have different internal 
characteristics and differing primary purposes) it is necessary to normalize 
the final effectiveness scores. The range [20] is chosen (with 0 denoting an 
ineffective system and 1 denoting a perfectly effective “ideal” system)  
5. Ideally the measures should be ratio scales which means that they have a 
natural zero point and numbers which are multiples of each other directly 
indicate their value. (For example, a system with an effectiveness measure of 
0.8 is twice as effectiveness as a system with a measure of 0.4).  It should be 
noted that ratio scales directly support the achievement of properties 1 to 4.  
 
All of these properties impact the choice of approaches to define MoEs. Two 
approaches from Decision Science meet these mathematical requirements and are 
considered as candidates for measuring effectiveness:  
1. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) [31] and.  
2. The probabilistic modeling technique of Bayesian Networking (BN), [32] [33] [34].  
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Both these approaches deal with measures between 0 and 1 with MAUT using a utility 
coefficient and BN using probability.  
 
Expected Utility expresses the worth of a consequence.  Expected utility is the 
probabilistically weighted sum of the utilities. In Decision Science under uncertainty, it is 
considered “rational” to choose between alternatives (a‟ and a”) based on the value of 
expected utility.  MAUT provides a basis for measuring expected utility but the 
formulation of the utility function is dependent on many complex independence 
conditions being established.  These independence conditions are difficult to establish 
and verify and consequently MAUT is often considered unsuitable for measuring 
effectiveness in highly complex domains.  In the case of this research, the decomposed 
system elements will be assumed independent and the MoEs will be measureable.   
Thus, the alternative often used is to provide a mechanism that can aggregate 
measures that account for relationships.  Such an approach is Bayesian Inference 
(commonly called Bayesian Networks, BN).  In common with MAUT, BN provides a 
well-grounded, consistent mathematical framework which (in addition) supports the 
forward and backwards propagation of evidence. [33]  So it is able to answer the 
questions:  
 
If I observe something:  
1. What may have caused this?  
2. What outcomes will this influence?  
 
Bayes law states that the probability of a given b equals the probability of b times the 
probability of b given a divided by the probability of a, which is stated notationaly by the 
following:  
Pr(a|b) = Pr(b) x Pr(b|a) / Pr(a).  
The notation Pr(a|b) means the probability of a given b.  
And by simple rearrangement: Pr(b|a) = Pr(a) x Pr(a|b) / Pr(b). This justifies forward 
and backward propagation of evidence.  
 
So within an effectiveness context, this rule can be used to answer the question “what is 
the effectiveness of a system given the effectiveness of another system?”  This feature 
is important because many complex systems function as members of larger systems 
and are influenced by other member systems. Therefore, a complex system may be 
viewed as a network. A BN is able to update the probabilities in uncertain nodes (using 
Bayes rule) given evidence obtained from related nodes. This property and the intuitive 
way BN model complex relationships among nodes make them a suitable technique for 
building causative models [33], [34]. There is evidence [35] to suggest that the predictive 
value of BN is robust against incorrect estimates of the probability values populating the 




For military systems, and particularly networked systems based on new technology, 
there is often insufficient data (or operational experience) to quantify a system‟s 
effectiveness.  So the recourse is often to guesstimate using expert judgment. In 
addition, to classical statements of effectiveness, such subjective (qualitative) judgment 
needs to be handled.  Cox‟s work [36] [37] is accepted as the justification for the use of 
subjective probability
 
within a Bayesian framework [34].  Cox derived Bayes‟ rule (and 
other probabilistic rules) from the rules of logic and two axioms
 
without reference to the 
frequentist definition of probability.  He thus claimed that probability theory, in essence, 
has involved two ideas: “the idea of frequency in an ensemble and the idea of 
reasonable expectation”.  Reasonable expectation is the probability of an event which is 
not based on extensive trials but more on subjective judgment and expert opinion. It 
provides a “measure of the reasonable expectation of an event in a single trial”.  These 
axioms [37] are:  
“the probability of an inference on given evidence determines the probability of its 
contradictory on the same evidence”; and  
“the probability on given evidence that both of two inferences are true is determined 
by their separate probabilities, one on the given evidence, and the other on this 
evidence with the additional assumption that the first inference is true”. that 
subjective probability is equally valid for modeling causal relationships under 
uncertainty [34].  
Both of these “axioms” can be considered to be valid in the domain of measuring 
effectiveness; that is, effectiveness and its inverse are related and the effectiveness of 
two systems combined is dependent on the effectiveness of the first system, if the 
systems are causally related.  
So by measuring effectiveness and using values between zero and one, it is possible to 
aggregate their effects as long as their causative relations can be established. Thus,  it 
is possible to build a BN to model effectiveness in such a way that total system 
effectiveness can be inferred from subsystem effectiveness [33]. This assessment of 
effectiveness can be performed in both a “forward” and “reverse” direction; that is, given 
subsystem effectiveness total system effectiveness can be determined or if a system is 
effective, measures of required subsystem effectiveness can be inferred.  The same 
inference that total system effectiveness can be determined given subsystem 
effectiveness follows for MAUT under the family of systems approach (independence 
conditions) and true MoEs (according to Smith and Clark‟s criteria). 
Measures of Effectiveness 
If performance measures can be causatively mapped to an effectiveness measure then 
an approach can be also used to calculate this measure but this mapping should be 
done within a subsidiary model.  Based on Sproles‟ distinction between Measures of 
Performance (MoP) and MoE, a MoP measures the internal characteristics of a solution 
while a MoE measures external parameters that are independent of the solution and are 
measurements of how well the problem has been solved.  According to Sproles a MoE 
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is: “A measure of the ability of a system to meet its specified needs (or requirements) 
from a particular viewpoint(s). This measure may be quantitative or qualitative and it 
allows comparable systems to be ranked.  These effectiveness measures are defined in 
the problem-space.  Implicit in the meeting of problem requirements is that threshold 
values must be exceeded”. [25] 
 
A Security Risk is the probability of sustaining a loss of a specific magnitude during a 
specific time period due to a failure of security systems.  The intended MoEs are the 
primary variables for the determination of any given system‟s effectiveness under the 
proposed heuristic approach and will be the error rates for the different subsystem 
components (rates of Type I () and Type II () error).  These will be used as the 
fundamental input variables for the proposed model.  Every functioning system should 
have an established testing procedure and records on “false positive or false alarms” 
(Type I errors) and “false negative or missed alarms” (Type II errors).  There are such 
things as nuisance alarms (such as a small animal tripping a motion sensor) which 
depending on context and focus can be treated as either false alarms (Type I error) or 
true alarms (no error).  These error rates have the distinct advantage of being directly 
measurable in many cases and will facilitate the determination of system effectiveness 
for specific systems that can be tracked over time.  The missed alarms are the 
inherently the most difficult rate to determine.  Yu-Sung Wu et. al. developed an 
estimation procedure for intrusion containment in large scale distributed systems to 
reduce error propagation, thus helping the system remain functioning.  [38] 
2.2 Specific Hypothesis 
Given the research questions A and B as previously stated we can answer them as 
follows: 
A. Can a methodology be formulated and used to analyze the effect of incorporating 
measures of effectiveness concepts at the component-system level, yet assess 
them at the system level?   
Hypothesis 1: The Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) methodology is a 
valid approach to incorporate safeguards measures of effectiveness at the 
component-subsystem level and assess them at the safeguards system 
level. 
As Druzdzel established, by measuring effectiveness and using values between zero 
and one, it is possible to aggregate their effects, that is, given subsystem 
effectiveness, total system effectiveness can be determined.  The method under 
consideration in this research is MAUT whose fault is the inability to determine 
independence of subsystems in highly complex systems and an expected utility 
when experience with the system is low.  By focusing on Families of Systems which 
are independent and interoperable, we can use the independence of subsystems 
allowing the MAUT algebra to be used and, further, the intended effectiveness 
evaluation is of a well defined and operating system that provides historical MoE 
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data on each subsystem allowing this question to be answered in the affirmative for 
MAUT. And thus answers Research question A. and affirms Hypothesis 1: 
 
B. Can uncertainties, such as incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties in the modeling environment be addressed through heuristics in a 
system effectiveness methodology? 
Hypothesis 2: Calculating safeguards system effectiveness using Type I 
and Type II error rates is a valid modeling approach upon which to base an 
effectiveness methodology with incomplete data, rapidly changing 
technologies, and uncertainties.   
 
This research proposes a shift from a probabilistic approach that analyzes the 
likelihood of events (by whatever means) and determines effectiveness based on 
these probabilities to a heuristic approach which uses the experience of measured 
error rates on a real-time sample (Type I and Type II errors previously mention and 
seen in Table 2).  Tversky and Kahneman describe three heuristics that are 
employed in making judgments under uncertainty:  
1) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to 
judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B;  
2) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people 
are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular 
development; and  
3) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction 
when a relevant value is available.  
 
They indicate that these heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but 
they lead to systematic and predictable errors. [39]  Dewhurst, et. al. indicate that 
research in cognitive psychology indicates that individuals at all educational levels 
use heuristics especially when making a decision within a limited amount of time. 
[40]  Therefore, it seems reasonable to move toward heuristics when making 
decisions in real time and on limited data.  In the case of personal observations, 
factors such as accuracy of one‟s memory and uniqueness of one‟s prior 
experiences, may affect the validity of answers arrived at through heuristics. [40].  In 
the case of using a measured rate of errors, as proposed in this research, the more 
data gathered over time (producing an increased sample size) the closer the 
heuristic methodology is to the probabilistic likelihood of events methodology.  When 
in practice, the intended effectiveness evaluation described in this research, is of a 
well defined and operating system that provides historical MoE data on each 
subsystem allows this question to be answered in the affirmative and affirms 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
To validate Hypotheses 1 and 2, the posited methodology and calculation approach will 
be compared to an existing probabilistic calculation methodology using theoretical 
values of system effectiveness.  
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Table 2 Type I and II Errors 
Statistical Decision  
True State of the Null Hypothesis (H0)  





Type II error 
() FNF 
Reject H0 






The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) states that regarding 
model validity “It is crucial to prove that the model is trustworthy and suitably represents 
reality, particularly in cases where a feel for system behavior is absent, or when serious 
consequences can result from inaccuracy.  Models can be validated by: (1) Experience 
with application of similar models in similar circumstances; (2) Analysis showing that the 
elements of the model are of necessity correct and are correctly integrated; (3) 
Comparison with test cases in the form of independent models of proven validity or 
actual test data; and (4) The modeling schema itself can be validated by using small 
scale models.”[19]] 
2.3 Applicable Theory 
Baker, et. al. show the interactions between Risk, Consequences, Threats and 
Vulnerabilities under a homeland security framework, which can be seen in Figure 5.  
This leads to a risk relationship seen as follows [41]: 
 
R = C x T x V, 
where: 
R = Risk associated with an adversary attack and/or system/asset failure 
C = Consequence(s), the negative outcomes associated with degradation or 
failure of the system or asset(s). Consequences of an attack can be measured by 
loss of life, economic impact, loss of public confidence, or other metrics 
T = Threat, the probability or likelihood that a given attack scenario with the 
potential to disrupt systems or assets and cause undesirable consequences will 
occur. Threats are characterized by their means and likelihood of occurrence  
V = Vulnerability, a weakness in the system or asset, or supporting systems or 
assets (e.g., security systems, etc.) to the threat (T) that would cause 





Figure 5 Risk, Consequences, Threats and Vulnerabilities 
 
 
Baker, et. al. ultimately quantify risk with the following equation [41]: 
 




R = risk associated with adversary attack 
PA = likelihood of the attack 
PE = probability security system is effective against the attack 
(1 – PE) = probability that the adversary attack is successful (also the probability 
that security system is not effective against the attack) 
C = consequence of the loss from the attack. 
 
A key question becomes: What is the likelihood of the attack (PA)?  It is a general rule of 
thumb to assume the probability of attack =1 and this term drops out of the equation.  
The next Key Question becomes what is the probability security system is effective 
against the attack (PE)?  Estimates for PE are taken from past experience (personal 
experience or testing) or industry data (which again supports the heuristic 
methodology).  In determining the consequence value (C) any number of factors can be 
involved however, in this research the values assumed are: 
0.0 = No impact/consequence 




Thus the only consequence of importance to the system is significant which requires 
action and the risk equation reduces to: 
 
R = 1-PE 
The focus for the effectiveness of a security system becomes the probability security 
system is effective against the attack (PE, or in a layered system the layers effectiveness 
or PEL). 
 
The DOE defines a system performance effectiveness equation for a layered system 
of protection in DOE M 470.4-1, Attachment 2, Part 1, Section E, Appendix 4, (Page 4-
1) as follows [42] Shown here: 
 




PEL = the system effectiveness contribution for layer L; 
 
PIL = Probability of Interruption given first detection at layer L, PIL = PDL if detection on 
layer L is timely, and is equal to 0 (PIL = 0) if detection is not timely; 
 
PDL = Probability of Detection at layer L, PDL = PSL x PAL on layer L. PDL is the probability 
of first detection at layer L, given that detection has not occurred at an earlier layer, 
multiplied by the probability of sensing at an earlier layer, multiplied by the probability of 
sensing at layer L (PSL) and the probability of assessment at layer L (PAL); 
 
PSL = Probability of Sensing on layer L; 
 
PAL = Probability of Assessment on layer L; and 
 
PNL = Probability of Neutralization given first detection at layer L. 
 
L = the number of detection layers in the system before the critical detection point 
(CDP) in the adversary path(s). Detection after the CDP must be counted.   
 
PEL = the system effectiveness of the layer. The system effectiveness of the layer is the 
product of the probability of interruption of the layer and the probability of neutralization 
given that detection occurred at that layer (PIL x PNL). The probability of neutralization is 
determined discretely for each layer given detection at the layer. The neutralization 
determination is made if detection (regardless of the extent) takes place at the layer in 
question. Neutralization will occur sometime past the detection point and would be valid 
for the probability of neutralization of that specific layer. 
 
PDL = the product of the probability of sensing and the probability of assessment of the 
layer (PSL x PAL). Note that detection and assessment will be different between the 
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elements of the layer and between layers. PIL of the layer is defined as PIL = PDL if 
detection on layer L is timely, and is equal to 0 (PIL = 0) if detection is not timely. 
 
The contributions of each layer along the adversary pathway are then combined to 
determine the overall system effectiveness, where the overall system effectiveness is 
provided by the sum of the contributions of each layer (only those encountered along 
the adversary pathway) to the system effectiveness.  An example of the system 
effectiveness equations for a three-layer system protecting SNM would be as follows: 
 
PE = PE1 + {(1 – PI1) x PE2} + {1 – (PI1 + {(1 – PI1) x PI2}) x PE3}  
 
This equation uses a probabilistic focus for the effectiveness calculation and establishes 
the procedure for calculating effectiveness of subsequent layers.  In the case of the 
example facility with graded access, the layers could correspond to the four layers 
indentified (PPA, LA, PA, and MAA) in Figure 3.  The DOE system performance 
effectiveness equation is the most similar in scope to the methodology used in this 
research.  Facility scenarios will be explored to compare the DOE method to the 
proposed heuristic method for a comparison of the techniques and indicate their 
complimentary nature.  Further, in Chapter 4, a direct comparison (on a one layer 
system) of this probabilistic methodology to the posited heuristic utility methodology will 
be made in order to validate the research Hypothesis 1: “The Multi-attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) methodology is a valid approach to incorporate safeguards 
measures of effectiveness at the component-subsystem level and assess them at 
the safeguards system level.” 
 
For this research the probability of neutralization is assumed to be very close to 1 
reducing the effectiveness equation for a single layer to: 
 
PE = PD 
In many cases the performance of a single layer detection system can be 
characterized by two primary parameters: the detection probability, PD, and the false 
alarm or false positive rate (or Type I error).  A good detector has a very high 
detection probability (as close to 100 percent as possible), while still maintaining a very 
low rate of .  These two parameters are coupled, primarily through the detection 
threshold (t) as seen in Figure 6.  The more sensitive the detection threshold is, the 
higher the false alarm rate.  As the threshold is moved to the left, i.e., the device is 
adjusted to detect lesser incidences of noise plus signal and the detection probability 
increases but a larger area of the signals is included in the uncertain population, 
representing a higher false alarm rate. 
 
Any detection scheme depends on a separation of the two peaks: the probability 
distribution of the noise and that of the noise plus signal and as the signal to be 
detected decreases, the two curves move together (i.e., the distribution of signals will be 






Figure 6 Hypothesis Testing Errors 
 
 
The true combined detection probabilities and false alarm rates can only be determined 
by measurements in an operational environment.   
Detection Criteria 
What actually constitutes acceptable detection probability and false alarm rate is not 
easily determined. The former is a question of acceptable risk while the latter is an 
operational problem. Setting the minimum acceptable detection probability is a 
subjective issue. If there were 10 attempted bombings per year (out of 40 million 
international enplanements), a detection probability of 0.90 would allow on average one 
expected dangerous situation (and sometimes more) to go undetected per year.  If there 
were only one bomb attempt per year, the statistical expectation would be for one to go 
undetected about every 10 years.  Would a terrorist be deterred by these odds and 
would the flying public accept them as “safe”? The operational part of the problem can 
be analyzed reasonably objectively, yet it, too, is difficult to specify precisely. 
 
When we consider the effectiveness of procedures for predicting the system 
effectiveness, we find that present methods for measuring the power of such a predictor 
procedure are less than satisfactory. Typical measures involve (a) developing a statistic 
that serves to predict the effectiveness, (b) selecting a cut-off value of that statistic, and 
(c) counting the number of correct classifications and misclassifications when this 




because it does not take into account the fact that misclassifications of the two different 
kinds may bear different costs for the users of the system. In this setting a tool, as 
described by Swets, used for evaluating the effectiveness of a prediction procedure is 
the “Receiver Operating Characteristic” (ROC) of the prediction method itself [43] [44].  
The ROC is a curve that represents the fraction of all effective cases that would be  
classified correctly, plotted as function of the fraction of all cases in which the system is 
ineffective, but is falsely predicted to be effective.  In other words, it measures the ability 
of the predictive scheme to correctly detect effective decisions, while keeping track of 
the degree to which the scheme generates “false alarms”.  
 
The importance of the ROC lies in two facts: (1) it permits users of the procedure to 
select thresholds for classification that are appropriate to their own assessments of the 
relative cost of missing cases as opposed to false alarms in which they incorrectly 
predict effectiveness; and (2) The relative strength of two procedures for predicting the 
effectiveness can often be read easily from the ROC, since a prediction procedure 
whose ROC curve lies always above that of another procedure will be superior to it no 
matter what the user‟s specific estimates of costs and values may be. 
 
Safeguards systems are fundamentally alarm systems and the basic system response 
is to create an alarm when a condition is not as it should be.  There are numerous 
situations that could be considered failures or errors under these circumstances; 
however, some background in errors will be useful.  In particular, the issue of the type of 
error needs to be developed.  Miller tracks the history of the terms TYPE I ERROR and 
TYPE II ERROR [45].  In their first joint paper Neyman and Pearson in 1928 referred to 
"the first source of error" and "the second source of error" [46].  Neyman and Pearson 
progress to use the term “Errors of first and second kind” in 1933 [47].  The first use of 
the terms Type I error and Type II error is then made by Neyman and Pearson in 1933 
in their work "The Testing of Statistical Hypotheses in Relation to Probabilities A Priori 
[48].  A table depicting those errors was seen in Table 1 and is now modified with 
respect to alarms and presented as Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3 Type I and II Errors as Alarms 
Decision  
True State  















Neyman and Pearson formed the basis of statistical hypothesis testing, and Figure 6 
shows a common graphic that illustrates the principles involved.  The fundamental 
approach is to fix a probability of a Type I error arbitrarily (called the significance level 
usually 0.05 or 0.01) and then choose a criterion so that the probability of a Type II error 
is minimized.  Neyman and Pearson showed that the best test was in terms of the 
likelihood ratio.  Under their rule the alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted when the 
likelihood ratio is greater than t where t is the test threshold and is chosen to produce 
the desired significance level of a Type I error.  Often, instead of considering the 
probability of a Type II error, the quantity 1 minus the probability of a Type II error 
(which is the probability of accepting H1 when H1 is true) or, the power of the test 
becomes the focus.  Table 3 also includes another terminology used in diagnostic 
analysis (TPF - true positive fraction, FPF - false positive fraction, TNF - true negative 
fraction, FNF - false negative fraction) 
 
Sage and Rouse formulated categories of errors in an assessment and response 
framework such that errors could be: (1) errors in the detection of a problem, (2) errors 
in diagnosis of a problem, and (3) errors in planning and executing actions [49].  This 
work only looks at the Type I and Type II error rates in the system and does not use the 
taxonomy that Sage and Rouse mention. 
 
Villemeur describes Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in which FMEA is an 
inductive analysis used to systematically study causes and effects likely to affect the 
performance of a system.  There are four main steps in performing an FMEA: “(1) 
Definition of the system, its function and components; (2) Identification of the 
component failure modes and their cause; (3) Study of the failure mode effects; and (4) 
Conclusions and recommendations” [50] 
 
FMEA is focused on finding significant failure modes and making changes in the system 
that correct the failures.  While many of the activities in an FMEA are useful and 
essential in determining how to keep a system running, the focus is not to determine a 
quantified measure of achievement, through functional analysis, of the expected system 
results (effectiveness) of the system.  In a number of cases Type I and Type II errors 
may not be “failures” of the system.  Failure being defined in FMEA as: “The event in 
which any part of an item does not perform as required by its specification. The failure 
may occur at a value in excess of the minimum required in the specification, i.e., past 
design limits or beyond the margin of safety.”[19]  The system may have performed as 
designed and still created and error. 
 
Figure 7 shows the proposed basis for the effectiveness calculation which uses the 
rates of achieving the desired outcome.  The populations in Figure 6 and Figure 7 are 
assumed to be normally distributed with equal variance.   
 
Therefore in the context of a radar system Type I errors were false alarms and Type II 





Figure 7 Proposed Basis of Effectiveness 
 
 
attempting to make sense of radio signals contaminated by noise and today is 
commonly used in medical diagnostics.  J. van Schalkwyk uses applets in an online 
internet resource that takes user input to create example ROCs [51].  Figure 8 and 
Figure 9 show the affect of shifting the test threshold (t) on Type I and Type II error as 
well as the resulting ROC curve.  Figure 8 shows TPF, FPF (Type I error), FNF (Type II 
error), and TNF which in this context is related to a test for disease and a patient‟s true 
diagnosis.  The ROC curve plots TPF (1-) against the FPF (). 
 
In Figure 8 the ROC is seen on the right hand side (the curved portion).  The graph 
plots the TPF vs. the FPF and the straight line shows the condition of a 50% chance of 
being either true positive or false positive.  This is the case when the two normal 
distributions are not separated (have the same mean).  In the case shown in Figure 9 
there is a greater curve separation.  As can be seen in Figure 9, the larger curve 
separation creates a more severe curvature of the ROC.  The shape of the ROC can 
vary depending on the various combinations of distributions for the noise vs. signal.  
Figures 5 and 6 depict normal curves but ROCs can be constructed from any number of 
distributions leading to skewed curves in one direction or the other.  ROCs are useful in 
evaluating the response of a system and have been in use for many years. This affirms 
the hypothesis: “Calculating safeguards system effectiveness using Type I and 
Type II error rates is a valid modeling approach upon which to base an 
effectiveness methodology with incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, 
and uncertainties.  as ROCs evaluate operating systems using the TPF  and FPF 















to evaluate a system, ROCs do not directly calculate the effectiveness of a given 
system but yield a curve that allows the system manager to interpret effectiveness, 
however, with the modification proposed in this research, effectiveness can be directly 
calculated. 
2.4 Approaches 
There are two fundamental approaches to evaluating system effectiveness: a systems 
resource approach and a goal centered approach. [52]  Under a resource approach, 
system effectiveness is determined in terms of resource availability instead of specific 
task objectives (in the MIT taxonomy this is an efficiency).  Under a goal centered 
approach, system effectiveness is determined by comparing the systems performance 
against specific objectives (in the MIT taxonomy this is effectiveness).  Under either 
grading approach, there will always be interest in improving the system.   
 
This research is based on the goal centered approach to systems effectiveness 
evaluations and complies with the MIT definition of an effectiveness.  This is particularly 
important in systems that protect assets (safeguard systems) because if the asset is not 
safeguarded, at some point in time the probability of losing the asset to a malicious 
actor becomes unacceptable.   
2.5 Prior Work Related to Effectiveness 
Hamilton and Chervany look at evaluating management information systems 
effectiveness and as such provide detail for the two frameworks for system 
effectiveness.[53]  The goal centered view first determines the objectives of the system 
and then develops criterion measures to assess the system.  Under this framework the 
system‟s effectiveness is determined by comparing system performance to system 
objectives.  Under the system-resource framework effectiveness is conceptualized in 
terms of resources and their use (an efficiency).  The systems-resource view recognizes 
that there are considerations external to accomplishment of system objectives which 
need to be weighed in the analysis of a given system.  Hamilton and Chervany 
summarize problems in evaluating system effectiveness as: (1) Objectives and 
measures of accomplishments (MoEs in this context) are often inadequately defined 
initially; (2) Efficiency-oriented and easily quantified objectives and MoEs are typically 
employed; (3) Objectives and MoEs used to evaluate the system are not the same as 
those defined initially; and (4) Individual perceptions may differ on what the objectives 
and MoEs are; and further summarize that realistic mutual agreement, concerning the 
definition of appropriate objectives and measures of accomplishment, is typically not 
reached at the outset and this lack of agreement makes evaluation of system 
effectiveness difficult. 
 
Soban and Mavris recognize the need for an integrated and efficient framework that can 
rapidly assess system effectiveness for today‟s complex systems.  They recognize that 
the definitions of system effectiveness vary widely and are often application dependent.  
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They quote some of the more common definitions such as: (a) “The overall capability of 
a system to accomplish its intended mission” [8]; (b) “The probability that the system 
can successfully meet an operational demand within a given time when operated under 
specified conditions” [4]; (c) “A measure of the degree to which an item can be expected 
to achieve a set of specific mission requirements, and which may be expressed as a 
function of availability, dependability and capability” [54]; and (d) Soban and Mavris also 
present a new definition for system effectiveness as the term “effectiveness” implies an 
element of quantification. The following is the working definition of system effectiveness 
for this research. “System effectiveness is a quantified measure of achievement, 
through functional analysis, of the expected system results” [55] 
Soban and Mavris‟ purpose was to evaluate systems involved in air superiority in the 
theater environment, and they used a Response Surface Methodology which comprised 
two steps, facilitated by a common statistical evaluation program (JMP).  The first step 
was effect screening, which creates a linear model used to determine the sensitivity of a 
response to various inputs and to screen out, using a Pareto analysis, those variables 
that did not contribute significantly to the variability of the response. The second step 
was surface fitting, yielding a polynomial representation that gives the response as a 
function of the most important input parameters.  Soban and Mavris‟ output table had a 
listing for each variable in their model and how it influenced their effectiveness function.  
The methodology is useful in the specific application and uses system level metrics but 
looked at individual response terms and was not used to create an overall effectiveness. 
2.6 Area of Application 
The area of specific interest in this research is that of domestic safeguards systems 
consisting of Physical Protection, Material Control, Material Accounting, and 
Management subsystems.   
 
Bennett, et. al. look at a general methodology for comparative evaluation of physical 
protection system effectiveness.  The Bennett (et al) methodology considers the 
interrelations of physical protection system elements and provides a framework for the 
integration of each element with: (1) A definition of what can be done to cause the 
undesired event (Fault Tree Study); (2) A physical description of the facility (Plant 
Physical Layout); (3) Detail of the security system (Security System Description) and (4) 
Characteristics of the adversary (Adversary Attributes). [56] 
 
The Bennett (et al) methodology involves a very detailed analysis that is time 
consuming to create, and while this type of analysis is essential during the design of an 
adequate physical protection system, ongoing evaluations of effectiveness become 
unwieldy.  Further, the methodology did not integrate a complete set of domestic 
safeguards subsystems and components. 
 
Wilkey et. al. worked on defining a set of quantifiable metrics to allow consistent 
analysis of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) effectiveness.  Their intent was to 
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model the effect of changes to the systems used and to quantify the extent to which 
these changes improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems. [57]  Their effort 
focused on: (1) Analysis of MC&A systems and identification of important activities; (2) 
Identification of MC&A activities that are amenable to quantified evaluation; (3) 
Selection of a set of MC&A activities from step (2) that are sufficiently representative of 
the MC&A program to allow their metrics to be used to evaluate the MC&A program as 
a whole; and (4) Development of quantitative metrics for the MC&A activities selected in 
step (3) and a function for using the metrics to calculate the overall system 
effectiveness.  
 
Wilkey‟s (et al) effort produced a breakdown of the MC&A Program in order for metrics 
to be established.  Detailed areas of metrics were presented.  The work focused on the 
areas of Material Control, Material Accounting, Measurement, and System Design; 
however, it did not produce a function to determine overall effectiveness for MC&A 
systems. 
 
Al-Ayad and Judd specifically look at a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of 
nuclear safeguards systems and describe an analytical tool for that evaluation.  The 
model evaluates probabilistic input data to evaluate performance using the probability 
and time to detect material diversion attempts and prevent them [24].  Their approach is 
to aggregate performance indices over all threats.  Their Aggregated Systems Model 
(ASM) uses a two step process to aggregate performance.  First each adversary type is 
assumed to select a strategy with the greatest chance of success.  Second weighted 
averages are calculated based on a subjectively assigned likelihood for each adversary 
scenario.  While this is useful during design, no ongoing performance data is 
contemplated or used in the analysis. 
 
Sicherman, Fortney, and Patenaude use a database model for evaluating material 
accounting effectiveness.  This model was implemented in a Protracted Insider Module 
added to the Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security 
(ASSESS).  It recognizes that an insider is likely to make a protracted effort to divert 
material.  The Protracted Insider module has four general steps in the material 
accounting effectiveness evaluation: (1) Specify activities capable of detecting 
anomalies for a target of interest, and how often they are performed; (2) Model each 
detection activity in terms of how data is generated, transmitted, processed, etc.; (3) For 
each activity, specify personnel with access to each stage in the activity affecting the 
integrity of material accountability information (e.g., people who measure, enter/transmit 
and process MC&A data, and those who are involved in calibration or other procedures 
that could affect the validity of accounting information); and (4) Perform an analysis 
using input from the previous steps to estimate probabilities of detection for each MC&A 
activity, given particular insider methods for subverting the activity. [58]  This 
methodology integrates all of the aspects of a safeguards system but, it is closer to 




2.7 Utility Theory 
Peter C. Fishburn, a noted pioneer in decision theory, describes utility theory as being 
concerned with people‟s choices and decisions.  He further elaborates that utility theory 
deals with “people‟s preferences and judgments of preferability, worth, value, goodness 
or any number of similar concepts.” [59]  Fishburn lists the two classifications of utility 
theory as predictive and prescriptive.  The predictive approach is concerned with the 
ability to predict choices or behavior.  The prescriptive approach attempts to indicate 
how an individual should make a decision.  In the case of effectiveness calculations the 
concept adapts to real-time decision making regarding how well a system is working.  In 
this case the effectiveness calculation is prescriptive in that the utilities of individual 
factors are those that the decision makers are determining as their preferences for 
importance in a multidimensional environment.   
 
Assumptions in utility theory include the primary proposition that utility numbers u(x), u(y)  




This is read: 
 
x is not preferred to y if and only if the utility of x is less than or equal to the utility of y. 
 
Fishburn makes a simplifying assumption of independence for the individual utility 
values.  In the case described for this research for a “family of Systems” it is assumed 
systems are decomposed to a point of independence.  There are two forms for 
multidimensional preferences:  
 
a) additive forms where 
 
If x =(xi1, xi2,,xij,,xin) then: 
 
 u(xi1, xi2,,xij,,xin)  =  ui1 + ui2 + uij+uin 
 
b) lexicographic forms which include one factor that is overwhelmingly more important 
than others. [60] 
 
Fishburn indicates that applications of lexicographic utilities appear limited because of 
the over-whelming importance notion. For an example, if a prisoner of war is unwilling to 
reveal vital information regardless of the torture he may undergo, his decision is based 
on an unwillingness to divulge the information and thus is the overwhelming factor. 
 
Utility theory is often used in selection of alternatives.  In this case the result is a choice 
between alternatives based on specific criteria or considerations.  Diane Halpern 
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presents a method and worksheet for selection of alternatives.  A summary of the 
process consists of [61] [62]: 
 
1. Frame the Decision. Make a precise statement of the problem that will help to 
narrow it. Give clear and careful thought to this first step. The way in which the 
problem is defined will determine the character of all the following steps. 
2. Generate Alternatives. Think of all the possible alternatives that could solve the 
problem.  
3. List the Considerations (Aspects). Write down all the variables 
(considerations) that affect the decision.  
4. Weight the Considerations. Give each consideration an importance score that 
reflects its relative importance to you. Use a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = of 
slight importance to me and 5 = of great importance to me. Some considerations 
will probably have the same weights, but your considerations should represent a 
range of importance ratings.  
5. Weight the Alternatives. Take the alternatives one at a time. For each 
alternative, decide how well it satisfies each consideration. Rate the alternative 
on each consideration, using a scale of  -2, -1, 0, +1, +2.  Positive numbers 
indicate the alternative is favorable or compatible (or “pro”) on that consideration; 
+2 indicates highly compatible, +1 indicates somewhat compatible. Negative 
numbers indicate the alternative is incompatible or unfavorable (“con” on that 
alternative; -2 indicates highly incompatible, -1 indicates somewhat incompatible. 
A rating of 0 indicates neither favorable nor unfavorable to the decision. In the 
column for that alternative, write the weighting next to each alternative. 
6. Calculate the Decision.  Do each alternative separately. Multiply the assigned 
weight for each consideration (1 to 5) by the satisfaction weighting for the 
alternative (-2 to +2). Write the product in the extra column next to that 
consideration.  To find the total assessment score, add all the products for that 
alternative. 
Table 4 shows a partially completed worksheet to illustrate the technique.  In this case 
alternate 1 (Alt 1) and alternate 2 (Alt 2) have been scored against considerations 1 – 7 
(Cons 1-7).  On the Cons 1 line which is weighted (5) and Alt 1 is weighted -2 yields a 
score for Alt 1 on Cons 1 of -10.  This continues for all alternatives in Table 4 and the 
total scores are for Alt 1 = -2 and for Alt 2 = 10.  In this case Alt 2 is preferred to Alt 1. 
 
Turban, and Metersky develop a utility theory approach (MAUT) to multivariable system 
effectiveness for the Naval Air Development Center.  They attempt to reduce subjective 
evaluation of the system's performance by developing a procedure, based on decision 
and utility theories, so that the evaluation can be calculated objectively.  Turban and 





Table 4 MAUT Worksheet 
 Alt 1  Alt 2  Alt 3  Alt 4  Alt 5  
Cons 1 (5) -2 -10 2 10       
Cons 2 (5) -1 -5 1 5       
Cons 3 (4) 0 0 0 0       
Cons 4 (3) 1 3 -1 -3       
Cons 5 (3) 2 6 -2 -6       
Cons 6 (2) 1 2 1 2       
Cons 7 (1) 2 2 2 2       





 U(Ai) = U(xi1, xi2,,xij,,xim), i = 1, 2, ,m 
 
And in looking at different solutions for a given system design one tries to maximize 
U(Ai).  Their approach is based on the additively assumption mentioned above which 
can be stated as System Effectiveness is the sum of the values of the measures of 
effectiveness (MoEs).[63]  The value of the MoE (ui) for each course of action is 
determined by the product of the utility of the MoE u(Mjj) times the utility of the 
performance level xij of the MoE [63]. 
 
uij = u(Mij)  xij 
 
Turban and Metersky modified the Churchman-Ackoff method in which the subjects 
were to give a 1.0 value to the most important MoE and values between 0 to 1.0 to the 
other MoEs [64].  According their modified method the subjects were asked to allocate 
100% of importance among all MoEs.   
 
The approach taken by Turban, and Metersky involved: (a) Use the modified 
Churchman-Ackoff approach to obtain rough estimates of the relative values of the 
performance variables u(Mij); (b) Use the consistency test suggested by Churchman 
and Ackoff to adjust and improve the estimation; (c) Employ the above method with 
several dozen independent judges (group judgment); (d) Employ a statistical test 
(Coefficient of Concordance) to find the degree of agreement among judges; (e) 
Reconcile differences among judges; (f) Find the utility of the output coefficients (xij); (g) 
Compute uij's and the system effectiveness (which is the sum of the values of the uij's) 
and (h) select the alternative course of action with the highest value 
 
The Churchman-Ackoff utility theory approach as used by Turban, and Metersky shows 
significant promise in developing a methodology (using today‟s technology i.e. a 
statistically analyzed web-based survey) for finding the correct proportional combination 
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of dissimilar and sometimes conflicting subsystems and subsystem elements into a 
combined measure of safeguards system effectiveness. 
 
Turban and Metersky assert that the additivity assumption seems to be reasonable in 
their case since they deal with narrow ranges of U(Ai), and with several uij's, none of 
which is significantly large (over 30% of U(Ai)).  They note that their procedure is 
valid in the range of one decision situation. 
 
This research uses a systems approach of defining and decomposing the top level 
system into units with measurable Type I and Type II errors (assumed to be 
independent) and the determining the utility factors through a web-based survey of 
experts in the domestic nuclear safeguards community.  An additive utility model will be 
used in this research but that does not preclude the use of a lexicographic model in 
future work.  This research is consistent with the assumptions of Fishburn in utility 
theory as well as the boundaries expressed by Turban and Metersky in the application 
to system.  Turban and Metersky have established a methodology that calculates the 
system effectiveness of design alternatives for systems in a static case.  The extension 
from the static analysis of Turban and Metersky to the dynamic analysis in this research 
is reasonable. 
2.8 Facility Scenarios 
A safeguarded facility could contain any number subsystems or layered defenses for 
protecting the material.  Figure 10 shows a situation under which the defenses are seen 
in three distinct layers.  The layers can be seen as dependent (sequential) or 
independent.  The DOE system performance effectiveness equation (here seen 
when PEi = Pdi) would model this situation with the layers considered sequential and 
dependent as PE = protection effectiveness. 
 
PE = Pd1 + {(1 – Pd1) x Pd2} + {1 – (Pd1 + {(1 – Pd1) x Pd2}) x Pd3}   
This approach scenario dependent and is based on an analysis of the attacker‟s 
pathway and predetermining it to be a linear attack (Layer 1 then Layer 2 then Layer 3).  
Figure 11 shows a graphic that includes three layers subject to linear attack.  In each 
layer 70% of the attacks are detected/neutralized (Pd = 70% for each layer can be seen 
in Figure 11) resulting in a PE = 0.97 for this specific situation as seen in Table 5.  The 
heuristic system effectiveness approach would model a three facility as not being 
scenario dependent and the layers would be independent of attacker pathway as seen 
in Figure 12 and the equation used to calculate system effectiveness for a family of 
systems using MAUT would be: 
 















Table 5 Comparison of Methods 
 ei ui ei ui 
Pd1 0.70 0.33 0.70 0.33 
Pd2 0.70 0.33 0.70 0.33 
Pd3 0.70 0.33 0.00 0.00 
PE 0.97  0.91  





     




Subject to: 10  ie   1iu   
Where: 
ui = utility of the ith subsystem 
ei = the effectiveness of the ith subsystem 
 
And with equally distributed utilities (33%), and 70% subsystem effectiveness and 
overall system effectiveness would be es = 70%.  This generic attack analysis would 
include non linear attacks such as an insider which has access to the facility and would 
not need to penetrate layers one and two, but could begin the attack inside layer three. 
 
Comparing the DOE method to the system effectiveness equation shows that for a 
specific dependent layered pathway analysis, the protection effectiveness can be very 
high (PE = 0.97) while the system effectiveness would still be 70%.  Also seen in, if one 
of the layers loses effectiveness the PE = 0.91, which in the specific case of the linear 
attack, may still be acceptable for that pathway, however, the system effectiveness is 
reduced significantly to es = 0.47, which would likely be an unacceptable situation for the 
generic non-directional attack.  
 
The two approaches are not measuring the same phenomenon but are complimentary.  
During the design and initial vulnerability assessments (VAs) of the nuclear safeguarded 
facility, all the possible attack pathways are analyzed.  These initial VAs can require 5 
technical experts for up to a year doing full time analysis. [65]  During operation of the 
facility however, the system effectiveness methodology would be used to determine 
near real time operational system effectiveness performance (es).  This relationship to a 
generic system lifecycle can be seen in Figure 13.  There are, on an approximately 
annual basis, periodic VAs, which require 5 technical experts for approximately 3 weeks 
(or more on complex facilities). [65]  A system effectiveness calculation can be included 
in the design of the system and provide ongoing performance information.  In this case 
a statistician already on staff could provide weekly (or daily) updates of system 
performance with very limited effort.  Should the ongoing system effectiveness 
measurement give the system owners enough information and confidence to extend the 
time between periodic VAs or shorten the time required to perform the VA, significant 
cost savings could occur. 
 
Summarizing the two methods, the system effectiveness calculation represents a more 
robust (capable of performing without failure under a wider range of conditions) 
measure than the scenario dependent protection effectiveness calculation.  This means 
that as es increases so does the robustness of the system.  As the protection 
effectiveness (PE) increases the system is only improving with respect to a specific 











Chapter 3 Research Methodology  
Chapter three presents the “research methodology” for answering the research 
questions and confirming the hypotheses.  In Chapter 1 the research was determined to 
be important and needed in the domestic safeguards CoP.  Chapter 2 provided a 
comprehensive review of the relevant literature.  Chapter 3 will present the 
“methodology for determining system effectiveness” (System Effectiveness 
Methodology) in summary but focuses on the “research methodology” for answering the 
research questions and confirming the hypotheses.  To address the research questions 
(A. and B.) and hypotheses 1 and 2), a checklist of questions must be addressed:   
 
A. Can a methodology be formulated and used to analyze the effect of incorporating 
measures of effectiveness concepts at the component-subsystem level, yet 
assess them at the system level?  
 
Hypothesis 1: The Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) methodology is a 
valid approach to incorporate safeguards measures of effectiveness at the 
component-subsystem level and assess them at the safeguards system level.  
 
1. Is the proposed solution a Methodology? 
 To be shown through synthesis of literature definitions 
2. Are the selected inputs measures of effectiveness? 
 To be shown through a survey users to determine measures and 
synthesize results 
3. Can the measures of effectiveness be aggregated at the 
subsystem/component level to produce an overall effectiveness measure? 
 Develop a function and heuristic to support aggregation 
4. Can the System Effectiveness Methodology be compared to a validated 
methodology? 
 The System Effectiveness Methodology will be validated through 
Synthesis of valid approaches from literature review, application of 
same data to all and through simulation 
 
B. Can uncertainties, such as incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties in the modeling environment be addressed through heuristics in a 
system effectiveness methodology? 
 
Hypothesis 2: Calculating safeguards system effectiveness using Type I and 
Type II error rates is a valid modeling approach upon which to base an 
effectiveness methodology with incomplete data, rapidly changing 




1. Is the System Effectiveness Methodology robust than the DOE Protection 
Effectiveness Model? 
Show conditions under which the methodology has broader application 
2. As the level of experience increases how are the heuristics affected? 
Show that with increased experience and data there is more 
confidence in the heuristics 
3. What relationship do incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties in the modeling environment have with the heuristics? 
Show how incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties affect the heuristics. 
 
To develop the System Effectiveness Methodology, firstly a suitable MoE will be 
determined and evaluated, Secondly the “methodology for determining system 
effectiveness” will be defined and specific goals for the model/methodology and finally 
the research questions and hypotheses will be addressed. 
 
The MoEs selected are based on the error rates  and .  The MoEs will be developed 
and the MoE validity established based on Smith and Clark‟s definition. [28] 
 
Goals of the System Effectiveness Methodology are:  
 That it uses a clear definition of a system and system effectiveness that is broad 
across many applications  
 That it complements the probabilistic approach (DOE approach of PE);  
 That it add to the open literature concerning systems effectiveness measurement 
and  
 That it recognizes the complexities of system structures.   
 
The System Effectiveness Methodology: will be based on heuristic rather than 
probabilistic principles although probabilistic elements are compatible; is to be a 
generalization in order to have as broad of application as possible; will provides an 
ongoing single measure of effectiveness quantification based on system performance 
for a working system in near real-time.  A summary of the System Effectiveness 
Methodology would have the following steps: 
 
1. Define the family of systems to be evaluated. 
2. Decompose the system into subsystems (to the point that error rates can be 
measured). 
3. Determine the utilities (ui) of each subsystem. 
4. Measure the error rates  and  for each subsystem. 
5. Calculate the subsystem effectiveness (ei) for each subsystem (function 
addressed later in this chapter). 
6. Calculate es using the following Family of Systems Effectiveness Equation: 
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 iieues  essEffectiven System  
3.1 Introduction To System Effectiveness Function 
Hamilton and Chervany summarize problems in evaluating system effectiveness as: (1) 
Objectives and measures of accomplishments are often inadequately defined initially; 
(2) Efficiency-oriented and easily quantified objectives and measures are typically 
employed; (3) Objectives and measures used to evaluate the system are not the same 
as those defined initially; and (4) Individual perceptions may differ on what the 
objectives and measures are.  Hamilton and Chervany summarize that realistic mutual 
agreement concerning the definition of appropriate objectives and measures of 
accomplishment is typically not reached at the outset and this makes evaluation of 
system effectiveness difficult.[53].  Soban and Mavris recognize the need for an 
integrated and efficient framework that can rapidly assess system effectiveness for 
today‟s complex systems.  They recognize that the definitions of system effectiveness 
vary widely and are often application dependent.[55]   
 
Hamilton and Chervany indicate that there are two fundamental approaches to 
evaluating system effectiveness: a systems resource approach and a goal centered 
approach. [52]  Under a resource approach, system effectiveness is determined in 
terms of resource availability instead of specific task objectives which is seen, according 
to MIT, as an efficiency [20]. The term cost-effective captures the essence of the 
resource approach but also leads many to confuse efficiency with true effectiveness 
measures..  The term cost-effective is usually modified by either “more” or “less” 
indicating a relative evaluation and not usually described in terms of percent effective.  
Under a goal centered approach, effectiveness is determined by comparing 
performance against specific objectives which agrees with the MIT definition of an 
effectiveness.  Often under a goal centered approach, the effectiveness is defined in 
terms of percent effective and usually indicates a more absolute measure of obtaining 
the objective.  Under either evaluation approach, there will always be interest in 
improvement.   
 
This research is based on the goal centered approach to systems effectiveness 
evaluations.  As was discussed the resource based approach is a measure of efficiency 
(MIT Definitions). [20]  For system effectiveness measurement, the concept is simple, 
know the system goal and know, with a measure of precision, how often the system 
goal is achieved. This is particularly important in systems that protect assets (safeguard 
systems) because if the asset is not safeguarded, at some point in time the probability 
of losing the asset to a malicious actor becomes unacceptable.  A standard definition of 
system effectiveness is made by Blanchard and Fabrycky “the probability that a system 
can successfully meet an overall operational demand, within a given time, when 
operated under specific conditions. ”[21]  This captures the nature of systems 
effectiveness but fails to account for types of errors.  Using this definition, the measure 
of effectiveness becomes how often the system functioned correctly (1-Type II error 
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rate).  What is lost is the rate that the system failed to function when it should have 
(Type II error rate) 
 
Type I and Type II errors are defined in statistics as errors based on testing the null 
hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis (H1). [48]  This is sometimes called a 
truth table and can be seen in Table 2 and Table 3.   
 
In a detection system, a Type I error, also called a false alarm, happens when the alarm 
is activated when it should not have been; a Type II error, also called a missed alarm, 
happens when the alarm is not activated when it should have been.  The probability of 
each of these wrong decisions is denoted by:  
 = probability of false alarm, that is, the probability of having no threshold (t) 
exceedance but alarm activation.  
= probability of missed alarm, that is, the probability of having critical threshold 
exceedance but no alarm activation.  
The tolerance of a type I or II error is related to a trade-off between the benefits of a 
correct decision and the costs of a wrong decision and it could vary substantially, 
depending on the relative consequences of possible missed and false alarms. For 
example, the cost of a false alarm at the airport for metal detection is a few seconds of 
the passengers and screeners time while the cost of a missed alarm could be as high 
as a hijacked plane. 
 
In general, the effectiveness of a system is based on its ability to make correct 
decisions that minimize the probability of false and missed alarms while improving the 
cost-benefit ratio.  Because the probability of a wrong decision is primarily due to having 
only partial knowledge, any subsequent predictions are based on uncertainty.  
 
Conceptually a Type I error in relation to a system could be likened to the times the 
system acted when it should not have acted and the Type II error as those times the 
system did not act when it should have acted.  The terms  and  are the probability of 
Type I (false positive or false alarm) and Type II (false negative or missed alarm) errors, 
respectively.  Other conceptual statements relating to these quantities are: 1- which is 
the probability the system “did it right” and is often referred to as the confidence level 
of a test; and 1- which is the probability the system “did not do it wrong” and is often 
referred to as the power of a test. 
 
Using the quantities  and  a generic mathematical model for system effectiveness 
can be developed.  The posited relationship of system effectiveness (es) for a generic 
system can be constructed as follows: 
),( feS    
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In developing the functions for this relationship, another conceptual construct will be 
useful.  The quantities  and  can be thought of in safeguard systems as representing 
the probability (or rate) of either:  
1) false alarms () also called the false positive fraction (FPF), the converse of which 
() is the true positive fraction (TPF); or  
2) missed alarms () also called the false negative fraction (FNF), the converse of 
which (is the true negative fraction (TNF).   
As previously indicated there is always a tradeoff between false alarms and missed 
alarms based on the consequence of each.  In searching for a function that expresses 
the effectiveness in terms of  and which represent the error rates, the compliments of 
these values become of interest which indicate proper functioning.  Further, recognizing 
that the quantities , 1-,  and 1- are always valued from 0-1, a relationship for 
system effectiveness needs to appropriately emphasize the false alarm term or missed 
alarm term when needed and as such, a penalty (discount) on effectiveness based on 
these quantities needs to be developed.  Defining the baseline acceptable error ratio as 
r = / this becomes an indication of the system manager‟s tolerance of false alarms 
to missed alarms, where is the acceptable rate of Type I errors (false alarms) and  
is the acceptable rate of Type II errors (missed true alarms), each term can be adjusted 
based on this ratio.   
 
This leads to the posited function for system effectiveness which increases the effect of 
 or appropriately to the overall effectiveness and is seen below and which will be 
developed further in section 3.2. 
 




1/c for r > 1 ;  otherwise Ka = 1 
Kb = (r)
-1/c for r < 1 ;  otherwise Kb = 1 
 
The two parameters “r” and “c” are described as follows: 
 
Parameter “r” is the relative tolerance of false alarms to missed alarms (0/0) 
in a non stressed environment.   
 
Parameter “c” is the stress level to the system.  This can be cost, threat level, 
increased consequence of failure, or other local stresses.  When c = 1, stress is 
neutral. Increasing c means increasing stress levels. 
 




1) develop a relationship for Type I and Type II errors as they relate to system 
effectiveness and to posit this relationship as a function for calculation of a 
system‟s effectiveness (given the rates of these error types) and  
2) use an MAUT approach for combing the elements of a system into an overall 
effectiveness calculation.   
Following the ability to calculate a system‟s effectiveness where the overall errors rates 
can be determined, there are cases where the overall error rates for the full system are 
not available and it is necessary to decompose the system into subsystems and 
components that can have their error rates determined.  The utility theory, whereby the 
utility of each sub element is determined and the effectiveness for that element is 
measurable yields a methodology for combining the different values into one overall 
system effectiveness. 
3.2 Function Development and Use 
The starting point is the development of a relationship with which to calculate the 
effectiveness of a given whole system.  In this case, whole system, means a generic 
system that does “something” of value and that doing “the something” wrong is 
negatively valued and the error rates are known.  The starting point in attempting to 
develop a relationship calculating system effectiveness in terms of Type I error and 
Type II error is to posit that system effectiveness is a function of the types of error as 
seen below. 
 
),( feS     
 
Taking an intuitive approach the basic function was to simply posit that the effectiveness 
was the rate of true negative alarms (TNF or 1-) times the rate of true alarms (TPF or 
1-).  This could be also be described as the confidence level times the power as 
seen the initial equation below and Figure 14 (generated from a MATLAB program to 
graph a solution mesh of the algorithm) 
 
)1()1(  Se   
 
This simple function would likely be adequate if the relative consequence of false 
alarms and missed alarms were equal, and in a number of applications this may be the 
case, however, in real world nuclear safeguards applications this is rarely the case.  
Using the above equation as a starting point, the difference in relative importance of 
false alarms to missed alarms needs to be added.  Good design practice for a system 
will include a specific set of tolerances to false alarms (baseline tolerance of false 
alarms = ) and missed alarms (baseline tolerance of missed alarms = ).  The 
ratio of these tolerances will be defined as “r”, or the baseline tolerated error ratio (r = 




Figure 14 Effectiveness as a Simple Function of Confidence Level and Power 
 
 
With “r” defined, the next step is to determine where this effect should be added in the 
calculation.  Initially an inverse exponent relationship of the (1-) and the (1-) terms 
was chosen with the intention that with a preference for one type of error the other type 
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Figure 15 also generated from a MATLAB program to graph a solution mesh of the 
function shows the solution space (calculated effectiveness for values of and 
between 0 and 1) with r = 2 (as a convenience r is chosen as 2 where two false 
alarms are tolerated for every missed alarm).  There appears to be an opposite effect of 
that which is desired as the expected result would have tolerated more false alarms for 
the effectiveness value calculated.  Figure 15 shows the effectiveness falling at a higher 
rate verses false alarms than the rate of effectiveness decrease verses missed alarms 
and in fact shows tolerance for missed alarms.  Intuitively, when a tolerance for a given 
type of alarm is present, the rate of that type of alarm should be discounted and not 
enhanced.  This effect becomes more clear at the more extreme values such as shown 
in Figure 16.  In this case, there is a preference to allow 200 false alarms  to 1 
missed alarm .  Figure 16 shows that a small increase in the false alarm rate lowers 
the effectiveness to almost zero while a large increase in the missed alarm rate has 










Figure 16 First Iteration Solution Space r = 200 
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false alarm.  Another factor in the function structure is in the concept of discounting 
(using parameter r) the correct responses of the system ( and ) seems intuitively 
backwards and the discount should act on the rate of errors not the rate of correct 
responses.  In order to correct the situation a second iteration to the function was made 
and can be seen in the following equation where the discount operates on the error 
rates. 
 
)1()1( /1 rrSe     
 
Figure 17 shows the solution space for the above second iteration equation with r = 2.  
Again in this case two false alarms would be tolerated for every missed alarm.  This has 
the effect of discounting the error rate terms, however this applies the parameter r to 
both the  and  terms.  Intuitively, when a tolerance for a given type of alarm is present 
then only the rate of that type of alarm should be discounted.  Figure 17 shows that with 
a tolerance for false alarms the effectiveness calculation has a tolerance for false 
alarms, however missed alarms seem to have an enhanced affect.  This can be seen at 
the extreme values as seen in Figure 18, where false alarms  have almost no affect 
on the calculation of system effectiveness and a very small increase in missed alarm 
rates  causes a very significant decrease in effectiveness.  
 
Conceptually, the calculation function should affect (discount) only the term where there 
is a tolerance.  This leads to the creation of K-factors (Ka and Kb) which have separate 
domains.  The correction can be seen in the system effectiveness function below which 
also contains a further modification to the calculation and recognizes that outside 
influences/conditions can affect a system‟s effectiveness.  This term is introduced 
signifying increased consequences of failure or increased stress on the system 
(parameter c) that are changes from the baseline condition.  This idea of stress and a 
discount leads to a two parameter relationship.  The final form of the effectiveness 
equation can be seen below as the system effectiveness function. 
 
)1()1( ba KKe     
 
Where Ka = (r)
1/c for r > 1; otherwise, Ka = 1 
Where Kb = (r)
-1/c for r < 1; otherwise, Kb = 1 
 
The two parameters are described as: 
 
Parameter “r” is the relative tolerance of false alarms to missed alarms (0/0) in 
a non stressed environment (normal operations). 
 
Parameter “c” is the stress level to the system.  This stress can be (inter alia) 
threat level, increased consequence of failure, or other local stresses.  When 











Figure 18 Second Iteration Solution Space with r = 200 
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Figure 19 shows the solution space for the system effectiveness function with r = 2.  
Again in this case two false alarms would be tolerated for every missed alarm.  This has 
the effect of discounting the overall effectiveness based only on the tolerance for the 
specific type of alarm.  The relationship operates as expected (discounting a false alarm 
but not discounting a missed alarm even at extreme values as can be seen in Figure 20.  
The effect of parameter c can be seen in Figure 21.  Here the consequence/stress 
factor operates on the r parameter to lessen the discount. 
 
When comparing Figure 20 to Figure 21, it is shown that under the same error rates ( 
and ), a lower system effectiveness is determined by the function based on a higher 
stress or consequence of failure (stress factor - parameter c).  Figure 22 explores the 
affects of the stress factor (parameter c) on the discount.  Example values are used in 
Figure 22 which is a graph of the alpha term )1( aK  verses the Type I error () and a 
ratio r = 20.  This curve was generated in Microsoft Excel where Ka = (r)
1/c for r = 20  
and c = {1, 1.5, 2.,5 10, 20}.  The )1( aK  curve remains flat for high  values showing 
a large tolerance for false alarms before the effectiveness based on false alarms is 
reduced.  As parameter “c” increases above 1 the tolerance for false alarms (and thus 
the discount of the  error rate) is reduced.  This equates to increased stress on the 
system and changing the effectiveness based on the stressed conditions.  Stress or 
consequence conditions could include: cost of a false alarm; consequence of a false 
alarm; increased stress levels to the systems environment or other similar 
stress/consequences. 
 
With a high enough stress, the tolerance for false alarms could be canceled to a large 
extent.  A reasonable range for c has not been established in this research; however, 
the range could be from 1 to 20, 1 to 10, 1 to 5, or 1 to 2 depending on the application 
and the system owner‟s requirements. 
3.3 Case Study 
The example of airport passenger screening in Figure 23 identifies the basic system 
elements of a passenger screening system. [66]  In this example the Walk Through 
Metal Detector (WTMD) identified as C in Figure 23 will be the system boundaries.  In 
the WTMD case, a false alarm () will be defined as alarming when a small amount of 
metal in a non hazardous form (some analysts might call this a nuisance alarm since 
metal is detected but it is not a threat).  A missed alarm () would be a threatening form 
of metal making it through the WTMD.  In this example under non stressed conditions 
airport security may be able to accept 100 false alarms to 1 missed alarm (0/0 = r 
=100).  The solution space for this situation would appear as in Figure 24.   
 
If there is a stressed condition such as an specific threat to a given airport, then the 
effectiveness solution space changes in relation to the threat.  In this case the example 
of the stress factor is assumed to increase to c=5 is shown in Figure 25.  In Figure 25 



















Figure 22 System Stress Factor Curves 
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Figure 26 Example Airport Security Under Stress With Compensation 
 
 
effectiveness may be) has decreased significantly.  If the system owner wanted to make 
a change to the solution space to gain back a logical change would be to greatly 
increase the tolerance to false alarms. Such that r = 5000 and this can be seen in 
Figure 26.   
 
Figure 26 shows that the compensatory measure of increasing the sensitivity on the 
WTMD by allowing 5000 false alarms to one missed alarm has indeed increased the 
solution space for system effectiveness but it may not be considered enough and in that 
event some either some other compensatory measure would be required in order to 
regain baseline effectiveness requirements or additional risk would be accepted by the 
system owner. 
3.4 Safeguards System Effectiveness 
The safeguards system requirements are generally related to the definition of 
safeguards.  The DOE definition of a Safeguards System specifically lists three types of 
subsystems and implies another (integration can be correlated to management).  
Management is often not included in a system definition; however, this analysis adds 
management as an explicit subsystem.  A given safeguards system can have a variety 
of components.  The final form of a model will vary depending on the individual 




In any system, subsystems are identified to handle different systems requirements.  
These subsystems can be in layers and/or compartments.  The distinction is that 
subsystems in layers could cover multiple requirements leading to potential interactions 
between subsystems while compartmentalized subsystems would not have interactions 
leading to simpler mathematical terms.  The model chosen for this research is that of 
four independent compartments (physical protection, accounting, control, and 
management).  This is an idealized case; however, the case can be made that 
compartmentalized subsystems is the worst case for effectiveness.  In the absence of 
interaction, overlapping subsystems represent redundancy and increase the overall 
effectiveness for the overlapped portion.   
 
In this utilitarian approach, the physical protection, material accounting, material control, 
and management subsystems are assumed to be independent and compartmented.  
This leads to application of the Family of Systems Effectiveness Equation which is a 
relationship for several independent compartmentalized sub-systems: 
 iis eueness EffectiveSystem  
Where: 
ui = the utility the ith subsystem  
ei = the effectiveness of the ith subsystem 
 
Such that for: Physical Protection i = p; Material Control i = c; Accountability i = a; and 
Management i = m; also, the effectiveness of a Safeguards System (es) can be 
represented in a utility model as a linear combination the effectiveness of the Physical 
Protection (ep), the Material Control (ec), and the Material Accounting (ea) and 
Management (em) subsystems leading to Equation 7 which can be expanded in the 
domestic safeguards case such that we can: 
 
Let 
mmaaccpps eueueueue       
subject to: (s.t.) 
10  ie    1iu  
Where: 
up = the relative importance of the physical protection subsystem 
uc = the relative importance of the material control subsystem 
ua = the relative importance of the material accounting subsystem 
um = the relative importance of the management subsystem 
 
Given the defining relationship in the system effectiveness function and model in the 
family of systems effectiveness equation, subject to the relationships defined for each 
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subsystem, a repeatable and quantifiable value of system effectiveness for a given 
safeguards system based on the rates of Type I and Type II errors becomes workable.   
 




















mme    
With Kap and Kbp related to rp the tolerated ratio and stress level for the physical 
protection subsystem  
With Kaa and Kba related to ra the tolerated ratio and stress level for the material 
accounting subsystem. 
With Kac and Kbc related to rc the tolerated ratio and stress level for the material 
control subsystem. 
With Kam and Kbm related to rm the tolerated ratio and stress level for the 
management subsystem. 
 
This type of model and methodology also lends itself to a linear systems approach and 
subsequent optimization. [67] What remains is to determine the utility of the separate 
subsystems to define a solution space for calculating an example safeguards system‟s 
effectiveness and simulate an example environment to illustrate the utility of the 
methodology. 
3.5 Description of the Research Survey Design  
The fundamental approach used in this work for determining the relative importance of 
each safeguards system‟s subsystems was a web based survey voluntarily completed 
by Material Protection, Accountability, and Control practitioners, encompassing all areas 
of the safeguards field, in such a way that facilitated statistical analysis yielding 
reasonable subsystem component utilities (uij) which are estimations of the utility of the 
j
th component in the ith subsystem.  
3.6 Description of the Surveyed Population 
The surveyed population in this case will be defined as members of the Institute of 
Nuclear Material Management (INMM) and those that attend the INMM annual 
Meetings.  The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management was formed in 1958 [68] to 
encourage: (a) The advancement of nuclear materials management in all its aspects; 
(b) The promotion of research in the field of nuclear materials management. (c) The 
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establishment of standards, consistent with existing professional norms; (d) The 
improvement of the qualifications of those engaged in nuclear materials management 
and safeguards through high standards of professional ethics, education, and 
attainments, and the recognition of those who meet such standards; and (e) The 
increase and dissemination of information through meetings, professional contacts, 
reports, papers, discussions, and publications.  The INMM currently has over 1000 
members worldwide and holds annual technical meetings where approximately 900 
individuals, both members as well as interested and experienced non-members attend.   
3.7 Description of the Sample 
The sampling method was self selection.  The survey was voluntary and completed by 
those in attendance at the INMM 49th Annual Meeting held in Nashville TN.  The 
attendees were given a notice of the survey and the web link to the survey page and 
encouraged to take the survey during the week of the annual meeting or shortly 
thereafter.  The INMM holds an exhibit at each annual meeting with a high percentage 
of the attendees browsing through the exhibit area.  A booth with two laptop computers 
was constructed to allow exhibit attendees from the Annual Meeting the opportunity to 
participate in the survey during exhibit hours.  On numerous occasions both laptops 
were occupied and potential participants were asked to return an take the survey.  No 
records were kept regarding the actual number of potential participants which were 
turned away and never returned.  During the week of the exhibit, electronic mail was 
sent to each of the attendees that pre-registered indicating the booth number for the 
survey as well as giving the web link for individuals to take the survey online in their 
room, at work, or at home. 
 
There were 926 registered attendees at the conference (including those that registered 
on-site and therefore not included in the electronic mail notice).  A total of 102 
completed the survey.  This leads to a 95% confidence level of +/- 9.1% error.  This is 
the first such survey recalled by many of the participants and there are no records 
concerning how many of the 926 actually attended the exhibit so taking the 926 
population size accounts for the worst case survey completion rate.  While the rate of 
response leads to a fairly high error bar, cooperation from the INMM executive 
committee was helpful in achieving this rate of response and is a good first effort.  The 
INMM mission is to support research; therefore the executive committee supplied trade 
show booth space at a significantly reduced cost.  Small trade show gift items were 
given to attendees as inducements to take the survey and the verbal response from 
exhibit attendees indicated the gift items were very popular and indeed an inducement. 
3.8 Instruments  
The basic data collecting instrument was a web survey created with the assistance of 
the University of Tennessee (UT) Statistical Consulting Center (SCC) whose mission is 
to “help UT students, faculty, and staff enhance the quality of their research by working 
together to effectively apply analytical methods, especially statistics.” [69]  The building 
 
 58 
tool for the web survey was the “SPSS DimensionNet Interview Builder” which gathered 
response data and offered an option of output in an Excel comma-separated-values 
(CSV) data file.  Interview Builder also allows for creating and testing the survey prior to 
final distribution of the web link.  Figure 27 shows a graphic of the web survey under 
construction (in build mode) using the Interview Builder with introduction questions.  The 
web survey was beta tested by 15 volunteers with an MPC&A background.  During the 
beta test, questions were asked and an opportunity was given for feedback and to 
suggest additional components for the various subsystems.  The beta test assured 
more comprehensive subsystems and ultimately produced a higher quality survey 
instrument.  The questions in the final instrument were developed from the responses of 
the beta testers and through consultation with the SCC.   
 
The final complete survey tool is presented in Appendix I, however, a sample question 
for the rating of coefficients can be seen in Figure 28 as the respondent would see it on 
the screen. 
3.9 Procedures 
The target window of data collection was the INMM 49th Annual Meeting in July 2008.  
The meeting was held in Nashville TN and readily accessible for travel from Knoxville.  
An email was sent during the meeting to inform the members and attendees of the 
existence of the survey.  Support from the INMM executive committee was solicited to 
“advertise” the survey and encourage individuals to take the online survey.  The survey 
link remained open for a 2-week period after the annual meeting.  During the survey, the 
individuals were solicited for availability of cleansed data regarding the safeguards 
systems of which they were familiar.  However, no sanitized data were available. 
3.10 Survey Data Analysis  
The CSV data file downloaded at the end of the survey period had a record of 102 
responses.  Each of the respondents‟ uij values was reported on a scale from 0-100 with 
0 being “low” and 100 being “high.”  Every individual could have different total raw 
score; therefore, uniform scaling was needed for comparison purposes.  One could: a) 
take the mean of the raw responses and then normalize; or b) normalize the 
respondents‟ raw scores before taking the mean.  In the case of a), there was no 
assurance that a 50 raw score from a given respondent meant the same as a raw score 
of 50 from any other respondent.  So in this case in order to normalize the responses of 
an individual the value was expressed as a fraction of the total responses for the 
individual in that subsystem.  Therefore, an individual‟s responses are normalized 
according to the following equation. 
 
 


















Figure 28 Question As The Respondent Would See It 
 
 
An example of the calculation can be seen in Table 6 for an individual response on 
utility coefficients for their Plant Management importance responses.  In this case the 
individual rated Personnel Reliability within the Plant Management subsystem (the 
Personnel Reliability PMRank) as having an importance of 50 out of 100.  The total of 
all of the individuals‟ responses was 720 leading to a normalized Personnel Reliability 
PMRank of 0.0694.   
These normalized values were loaded into a statistical calculation program (JMP) which 
is a product in the SAS family of statistical software.  The graphical distributions and 
tabular moments of the responses for each question are the results of processing the 
full set of responses in JMP and the results of two example coefficients are listed in 
Figure 29.  In Figure 29 the straight red lines on the quantile plot and the curved red 
lines on the histogram indicate a fitted normal curve showing a visually good fit, 
however the normal quantile plot shows a good deal of skewness and the Shapiro-Wilk 
W Test (for less than 2000 data points) indicates the data are not normally distributed; 










Full Set of Respondents (102) 




Std Dev 0.0226318 
Std Err Mean 0.0022409 
upper 95% Mean 0.1128277 
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Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
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0.964032  0.0071 
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3.11 System Simulations 
Simulation refers to methods and applications that mimic the behavior of real systems. 
[70]  With the advancement in computing power available computer simulation is more 
popular and powerful.  Computer simulation refers to methods for studying a wide 
variety of models using numerical evaluation using software designed to imitate the 
system‟s operations or characteristics. [70]  Concurrent with the survey development, 
data gathering and analysis, simulations with appropriate subsystem components, were 
developed using a commercially available simulation software package (Arena 7.0).  
Historical error rate data was not available for analysis and validation so the simulations 
provide estimates of Type I and Type II error rates.   There were two simulations 
created: 1) an airport passenger screening system used to screen airline passengers as 
shown in Figure 23, provided by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); and 
2) a simple domestic safeguards system modified from earlier work by Coates. [71]  In 
both simulations the system components can be modeled for error production and the 
results used to calculate an overall effectiveness.   
 
In the airport passenger screening simulation the elements were the identification 
screening system, a combined X-ray/explosives system for checking bags and 
computers, and the walk through metal detector.   
A flow chart for this system to be simulated is shown in Figure 30.  At each decision 
point in the flow chart a Type I or Type II error can occur.  Figure 30 has a number of 
decision points and error rates built into the simulation such as: “Determine if ID is 
Acceptable” has a 99% OK rate; “Check Computer” has a 99% OK rate; “Check Bag” 
has a 99% OK rate; “Check Passenger for Metal” has a 99% OK rate; and “Hand Wand 
Positives” has a 99% OK rate.  After each decision there are assumed Type I and Type 
II error rates ( and rates = 1%), however, the fact that the decision rates are 99% 
and the error rates are 1% are only for convenience and one does not determine the 
other.  The airport simulation provided simulated error rates for comparison purposes 
between the DOE probabilistic evaluation as adapted for the particular system. 
 
The simple domestic safeguards system simulation modules at the top level can be 
seen in Figure 31.  There are three processing lines: “Insider Accounting”; “Insider 
Control”; and “Insider Management”” and the “Create Security Condition” line which 
does not have an insider.  Each of the processing lines is constructed in a similar 
fashion and using the example of the Accounting Sub-model the simulation modules 
can be seen in Figure 32 and the Security Sub-model modules can be seen in Figure 























insider is active or inactive.  The probabilities of the processing lines decisions for 
insider activity, alarm frequency and error rates can be seen in Figure 34.  The Security 
line sets the alarm level or security condition (SECON).  There are four security 
conditions: normal (SECON 4); slightly elevated (SECON 3); significantly elevated 
(SECON 2) and high risk (SECON 1).  The insider is active only when the security 
condition is either SECON 3 or SECON 4.  The probabilities of the security condition 
alarms can be seen in Figure 35.  These theoretical values are programmed into the 
simulation and used to calculate the theoretical system effectiveness for a test of 
convergence on the simulated values. 
3.12 Methodology Summary 
An additive MAUT approach has been chosen as a valid methodology for applying the 
posited system effectiveness function for determining effectiveness based on Type I 
and Type II error rates with the conditions for this calculation comparable to the validity 
claim of Turban and Metersky [63].  The application of Turban and Metersky was to 
determine the best design alternative solution of several designs a system.  This 
research advances that approach through the determination of effectiveness of an 
individual solution over time.  This research determines the utility of components of a 
simple domestic safeguards system through a statistically analyzed web survey of 102 
nuclear material experts.  Further the validity of the function will be determined through 
comparison of the results using the probabilistic methodology validated by the DOE in 
their system performance effectiveness equation.  Simulation of the Type I and Type II 
error rates will be used to compare the two methodologies and calculate a performance 
level of individual subsystems and components so that the overall system effectiveness 
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Chapter 4 Analysis 
Chapter 4 will take the results of the research and analyze their meaning by starting 
with the survey and simulation data.  Next this chapter will validate the System 
Effectiveness Methodology using an Airport Simulation and a Safeguards Simulation. 
4.1 Survey Data 
In analyzing the responses, the mean for each component‟s utility was chosen for 
inclusion in the overall effectiveness calculation.  An illustration of how the data were 
organized can be seen in Table 7 in row B (with numbers in blue).  Row C (numbers in 
red).  In row A of Table 7, labeled “Average Value From Full Survey” the mean utility 
values from the survey with all the components are shown (however not all columns are 
shown in Figure 36 which illustrates how the full model would be constructed).  When 
these utilities are summed across the line they are not constrained to sum to 1 (row A 
sums to 1.0001 in Table 7 and other rows in Figure 36 sum to 0.9999, 0.9998, 1.0003 
etc) but the methodology requires that the mean utilities sum to one, therefore the 
values from Row A of Table 7 are (as seen in row B with numbers in blue).  Row C 
(numbers in red) is generated by a random number generator in Microsoft Excel 
between 0 and 1 and represents a hypothetical effectiveness of the given component.  
The subsystem effectiveness represents the sum of the products of the component 
effectiveness times the normalized mean utility for that component, as illustrated in row 
D of Table 7 leading to a subsystem effectiveness of 0.7241. 
 
The normalized mean utilities received from the web-based survey have been tabulated 
in Table 8.  Table 8 contains both responses from the full data set (all 102 responses 
seen in Column A) and columns B-E show the responses for the filtered data.  The 
filtered data set includes the responses for respondents that have greater than 5 years 
of experience in their field.  A respondent with greater than 5 years experience in a field 
was deemed to have greater expertise in the area.  Therefore the Plant Management 
(PM) filtered column (column B) has responses only from those with greater than 5 
years of experience in Plant Management; the Material Control (MC) column (C) has 
responses from only those with greater than 5 years of experience in Material Control 
and so forth for Material Accounting (MA) and Physical Protection (PP).  Totaling the 
number of respondents of the filtered columns indicates that some individuals had 
greater than 5 years of experience in more than one area.  Therefore in the first row of 
mean coefficients (Personnel Training PMrank) the filtered mean value (from those with 
> 5 years of experience in plant management) was 0.36% less than the mean value of 
the full set of respondents (which can be seen in column F). 
 
In many cases the difference between the full data set and the filtered data set had very 
little difference and well below the error rate (95% confidence interval of +/- 9.1%) for 













































































































































































































































A Average Value From Full Survey 0.1097 0.1090 0.1084 0.1075 0.1028 0.0983 0.0959 0.0940 0.0889 0.0857 1.0001 
B Normalized to Sum to 1.0 0.1097 0.1089 0.1084 0.1075 0.1028 0.0983 0.0959 0.0940 0.0888 0.0857 1.0000 
C 
Full Survey 
Random Hypothetical (0.5 to 
1.0)  
Element Effectiveness Value 








Figure 36 Full Utility Model Calculations with Random Performance Levels 
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Table 8 Mean Response Tabulation 
 Full Filter     
Safeguards Subsystems and Components  PM MC MA PP Delta 
Basis 102 15 36 39 23 11  
      (Filter-Full) / Full 
Plant Management Component Rank       
Personnel Training PMrank 0.1097 0.1093    -0.36% 
Knowledge of MPC&A PMrank 0.1089 0.0989    -9.19% 
Personnel Reliability PMrank 0.1084 0.0995    -8.15% 
Org Communication PMrank 0.1075 0.1141    6.16% 
Org Coordination PMrank 0.1028 0.1016    -1.18% 
System Documentation PMrank 0.0983 0.1006    2.34% 
Configuration Management PMrank 0.0959 0.1009    5.28% 
System Oversight PMrank 0.0940 0.0953    1.40% 
Independent Assessment PMrank 0.0888 0.0848    -4.54% 
Budgeting PMrank 0.0857 0.0949    10.72% 
Physical Protection Component Rank       
Alarm Response PPrank 0.0633    0.0623 -1.52% 
Target ID PPrank 0.0623    0.0654 4.91% 
System Objectives PPrank 0.0615    0.0615 -0.03% 
Threat Definition PPrank 0.0612    0.0615 0.54% 
Alarm Assessment PPrank 0.0605    0.0618 2.19% 
Personnel Reliability PPrank 0.0602    0.0582 -3.29% 
Vulnerability Assessment PPrank 0.0598    0.0608 1.74% 
Facility Characterization PPrank 0.0591    0.0620 4.85% 
Material Control System PPrank 0.0591    0.0590 -0.22% 
Access Delay PPrank 0.0585    0.0566 -3.22% 
Secure Comm PPrank 0.0585    0.0572 -2.19% 
PP System Testing Pprank 0.0575    0.0589 2.34% 
Exterior Intrusion Sensors PPrank 0.0573    0.0572 -0.12% 
Special Response Teams PPrank 0.0568    0.0567 -0.31% 
Internal Guard Force PPrank 0.0564    0.0556 -1.41% 
Interior Intrusion Sensors PPrank 0.0554    0.0555 0.15% 
Independent System Assessment PPrank 0.0524    0.0497 -5.28% 
Material Control Component Rank       
MC Containment MCrank 0.0770  0.0754   -2.04% 
Entry Access Control MCrank 0.0764  0.0786   2.85% 
MC Item Tracking MCrank 0.0751  0.0745   -0.78% 
MC Surveillance MCrank 0.0743  0.0729   -1.85% 
 A B C D E F 
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Table 8 (Cont.) Mean Response Table 
 
 Full Filter     
Safeguards Subsystems and Components  PM MC MA PP Delta 
Basis 102 15 36 39 23 11  
      (Filter-Full) / Full 
MC PP MCrank 0.0733  0.0762   3.99% 
MC Process Control MCrank 0.0730  0.0732   0.38% 
MC Storage Monitoring MCrank 0.0723  0.0747   3.36% 
MC Procedures MCrank 0.0717  0.0745   3.90% 
Nuclear Material Portal Monitors MCrank 0.0713  0.0735   3.04% 
Tamper Indicating MCrank 0.0702  0.0636   -9.40% 
MC Waste Monitoring MCrank 0.0696  0.0705   1.24% 
MC Attribute monitors MCrank 0.0679  0.0652   -3.96% 
MC Oversight MCrank 0.0665  0.0665   -0.04% 
MC Daily Admin Checks MCrank 0.0614  0.0606   -1.29% 
Material Accounting Component Rank       
Accounting System MArank 0.0747   0.0768  2.81% 
Measurement Accuracy MArank 0.0717   0.0739  3.10% 
Physical Inventory MArank 0.0715   0.0743  3.96% 
Inventory Detection and Resolution MArank 0.0705   0.0720  2.18% 
Shipper Receiver Difference MArank 0.0704   0.0684  -2.80% 
Material Transfer Monitoring MArank 0.0700   0.0699  -0.22% 
Anomaly Detection MArank 0.0695   0.0695  -0.02% 
Measurement Control MArank 0.0684   0.0691  1.04% 
MA Statistical Evaluation MArank 0.0650   0.0670  3.17% 
MA Process Monitoring MArank 0.0647   0.0619  -4.46% 
MA Procedures MArank 0.0640   0.0640  0.01% 
Real Time Accounting MArank 0.0625   0.0582  -6.95% 
MA Holdup MArank 0.0609   0.0617  1.33% 
MA Independent Assessment MArank 0.0582   0.0573  -1.52% 
Oversight MArank 0.0580   0.0560  -3.48% 
Safeguards Rank       
Plant Management 0.2241 0.2095    -6.53% 
Physical Protection 0.2600    0.2578 -0.83% 
Material Control 0.2602  0.2666   2.49% 
Material Accounting 0.2557   0.2660  4.04% 





survey included: Knowledge of MPC&A PMrank; Budgeting PMrank; and Tamper 
Indicating MCrank. These coefficients are highlighted in yellow in Table 8.  The 
coefficients from the unfiltered and filtered data sets are used in an example overall 
system effectiveness calculation and the results are shown in Figure 36.   
 
The calculations in Figure 36 show two results for each subsystem: 1) using the utilities 
from the full data set; and 2) the utilities using the filtered data for each area of 
expertise.  The method of calculation in the last three columns of Figure 36 are 
Illustrated in Table 9.  Each of the subsystem effectiveness calculations (shown in 
Figure 36 and column A of Table 9) are combined by multiplying the subsystem‟s utility 
using both the raw subsystem utility from the survey and those normalized using the 
family of systems effectiveness equation (Table 9 column B and C respectively) times 
the subsystem‟s calculated effectiveness (column A).  This is done using both the full 
survey data and the filtered data while using the same randomly generated component 
effectiveness values.  The results do not show significant overall effectiveness 
differences from the two sets of calculations (76.76% with the full set utilities and 
76.91% for the filtered data utilities).  Further, these data do not account for is any 
component that could have an overriding affect on the system effectiveness as this was 
not part of the survey. 
4.2 Simulation Data 
A graphic of the airport passenger screening simulation model can be seen in Figure 
37.  This model was created using Arena 7.0.  The simulation model generated Type I 
and Type II errors based on predetermined percentages as noted in Chapter 3.  In this 
case each decision was set to 99% true (99% effective) and the rate of each type of 
error was set at 1 percent.  Daniel Morgan, of the Congressional Research Service of 
The Library of Congress, reported that screeners failed to detect items 20% of the time 
in 1987. [72].   
 
Current error rates are likely to be closely held, therefore, for this simulation an 
assumed effectiveness number of 99% was chosen for illustration purposes.  Table 10 
shows the values of the output variables from the simulation as seen in Figure 37 with 
three runs for each for 1000, 10,000 and 100,000 travelers.  Table 10 column A 
indicates the name of the variable in alphabetical order with column B indicating the 
notation used in the output files.  In the columns D, E, and F, there are sub cells with 
values that indicate individual runs which are identified in column C.  In the case on 
Identification Denied,” travelers were identified as having faulty identification (failed the 
ID screening) and did not proceed through the rest of screening.  Of the travelers that 
passed the ID screening, those that had either “Bag Denied,” “Computer Denied,” or 
“Metal Denied” were denied boarding.  In the case of run 1 with 100,000 travelers there 
were: 1006 that failed the ID screening; 932 with “Denied Bag”, 999 with “Computer 
Denied” and 10 with “Metal Denied” for a total of 1941 denied states.  An example of the 











Sum to 1.0 
Full Survey Plant Management 
Elements 
0.7241 0.2241 0.2241 
Filtered Survey Plant 
Management Elements 
0.7237 0.2067 0.2095 
Full Survey Plant Management 
Elements 
0.7114 0.2600 0.2600 
Filtered Survey Plant 
Management Elements 
0.7136 0.2632 0.2666 
Full Survey Material Accounting 
Elements 
0.8440 0.2601 0.2602 
Filtered Survey Material 
Accounting Elements 
0.8438 0.2626 0.2660 
Full Survey Physical Protection 
Elements 
0.7851 0.2557 0.2557 
Filtered Survey Physical 
Protection Elements 
0.7864 0.2545 0.2578 
Full Survey Total System 
Effectiveness 
0.7676  = 0.9999  = 1.0000 
Filtered Survey Total System 
Effectiveness 
0.7691  = 0.9869  =1.0000 








Figure 37 Simulation of Airport Passenger Screening 
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Bag Denied BD 
1 11 112 932 
2 12 86 972 
3 10 116 1026 
Bag Type I Error BTIE 
1 0 1 4 
2 0 0 9 
3 0 0 7 
Bag Type II Error BTIIE 
1 5 88 992 
2 8 90 1022 
3 5 85 959 
Computer Denied CD 
1 16 106 999 
2 12 110 1017 
3 17 107 1019 
Count Total Count Total 
1 1000 10000 100000 
2 1000 10000 100000 
3 1000 10000 100000 
Computer Type I Error CTIE 
1 1 2 12 
2 0 2 11 
3 0 3 12 
Computer Type II Error CTIIE 
1 9 87 971 
2 6 89 926 
3 13 113 968 
Denied Boarding 
from Computer, Bag, or Metal 
DB 
1 27 218 1936 
2 24 195 1991 
3 26 222 2040 
Denied Denied 
1 1 1 2 
2 1 2 2 
3 2 2 2 
Frisk Type I Error FTIE 
1 0 1 14 
2 0 0 3 
3 0 1 6 
A B C D E F 
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Frisk Type II Error FTIIE 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
Identification Denied IDD 
1 8 87 1006 
2 7 87 1014 
3 8 94 963 
Identification Type I Error IDTIE 
 1 2 10 
 1 2 9 
 0 2 7 
Identification Type II Error IDTIIE 
1 10 93 1013 
2 7 100 1028 
3 9 78 981 
Walk Through Metal Detector Type II Error MDIIE 
1 9 79 981 
2 12 100 989 
3 7 101 995 
Metal OK MDOK 
1 6 117 1033 
2 12 84 987 
3 6 101 1012 
Metal Denied MetDen 
1 0 0 10 
2 0 0 11 
3 0 0 9 
Total Type I Errors Total TI 
1 2 6 40 
2 1 4 32 
3 0 6 32 
Total Type II Errors Total TII 
1 33 347 3957 
2 33 379 3965 
3 34 377 3903 
Walk Through Metal Detector Alarm WTMD Alarm 
1 6 117 1043 
2 12 84 998 
3 6 101 1021 
Walk Through Metal Detector Passed WTMD passed 
1 986 9796 97951 
2 981 9829 97988 
3 986 9805 9806 










4.3 Validating the Methodology With Airport Simulation 
The utility theory of combining individual components of a decision into a single overall 
decision has been validated through the work of Fishburn [59] [60] as was specifically 
detailed in Chapter 2.  In the case of systems effectiveness, each component of the 
decision becomes the effectiveness of the system component.  Claims for validity of 
utility theory in calculating system effectiveness are made by Turban and Metersky [63].  
Turban and Metersky use the technique to evaluate the design alternatives that 
maximize the system effectiveness based on a specific utility for each measure of 
effectiveness.  Different design alternatives are evaluated and Turban and Metersky 
assume there is no overwhelmingly important factor in the effectiveness calculation (no 
one factor >30% of the total utility which equals 1) and their assumption is born out in 
this research where individual utilities for components ranged from 5% to 11% of the 
subsystem‟s total utility and no subsystem had greater than 26% of the total system 
utility (each of the four subsystems ranged from 22% to 26%). 
 
This work extends Turban and Metersky‟s work by applying their methodology to a 
near-real-time decision of a working system‟s effectiveness.  What remains is a 
comparison of the values using the system effectiveness calculation to a recognized  
approach.  A probabilistic approach for calculating system effectiveness has been 
validated by the Department of Energy in their system performance effectiveness 
equation [42].  
 
PEL = PIL x PNL = PDL x PNL   
 
Where: 
PEL = the system effectiveness contribution for layer L; 
PIL = Probability of Interruption given first detection at layer L, PIL = PDL if 
detection on layer L is timely, and is equal to 0 (PIL = 0) if detection is not timely; 
PNL = Probability of Neutralization given first detection at layer L. 
 
Adapting the equation to an airport passenger screening system requires the 
assumptions of: 1) the screening system is a single layer; 2) The detection is timely 
leading to PIL = PDL; and 3) PNL = 1.  For a passenger screening system these are 
reasonable assumptions.  This leads to a simplified equation for this one layer system 
or PE = PD.  The calculation of the PE = es = (system alarms) / (system alarms + missed 
alarms).  The data from the airport simulation are used to compare the two 
methodologies.  In Table 11 three quantities are used in the calculation: A) System 
Alarms (shaded yellow) or alarms the system made during the simulation run; B) Missed 
Alarms (shaded tan) based on the simulation parameters and; C) False Alarms (shaded 
green) also indentified by the simulation parameters.  The one layer assumption also 
leads to a simplified effectiveness calculation using the posited function as all System 





Table 11 Comparison of Effectiveness Calculation with Probabilistic Method 
Output Is The Average from 3 Simulation Runs of 100,000 Travelers Each  
Bag Denied 976.7 
Bag Type I Error (False Alarm) 6.7 
Bag Type II Error (Missed Alarm) 991.0 
Computer Denied 1011.7 
Computer Type I Error (False Alarm) 11.7 
Computer Type II Error (Missed Alarm) 955.0 
Frisk Type I Error (False Alarm) 7.7 
Frisk Type II Error (Missed Alarm) 0.0 
Identification Denied 994.3 
Identification Type I Error (False Alarm) 8.7 
Identification Type II Error (Missed Alarm) 1007.3 
Walk Through Metal Detector Type II Error 988.3 
Metal OK 1010.7 
Metal Denied 10.0 
Walk Through Metal Detector Alarm 1020.7 
System Alarms 4013.3 
Missed Alarms 3941.7 
False Alarms 1045.3 
= False Alarm Rate  
   = False Alarms / System Alarms
0.260 
Missed Alarm Rate  
   = Missed Alarms / (Missed Alarms + System Alarms)
0.495 
Overall Effectiveness Calculation With  
False Alarms of Equal Importance  37.3% 
Overall Effectiveness Calculation With  
False Alarms of Zero Importance 50.5% 
Overall Effectiveness Calculation With  
r = 2 (False Alarms/Missed Alarms under no stress) 47.0% 
Overall Effectiveness Calculation With  
r = 5 (False Alarms/Missed Alarms under no stress) 50.4% 
DOE system performance effectiveness equation reduces to  






As seen in Table 11 the probabilistic model (system performance effectiveness 
equation) used by the DOE, calculates the system effectiveness as 50.5% while the 
effectiveness function posited in this research showing equal base tolerance of false 
and missed alarms (r = 1) the effectiveness is calculated to be 37.3%.  When r is 
increased to 2 (base tolerance of two false alarms to 1 missed alarm) the effectiveness 
is calculated as 47.0% and when r is raised to 5, the effectiveness is calculated as 
50.4% and in fact converges on the DOE value.   
4.4 Validating the Methodology With Safeguards Simulation  
In order to tie this research together, a simple domestic safeguards system was 
simulated.  Figure 31 through Figure 35 detail the design parameters of this simulation.  
The assumptions are that the four sub-systems are independent with relation to 
effectiveness.  The simulation does have a component of when the insider is only active 
based on SECON level but these do not affect the error rates.  Recalling that we: 
Let: 
mmaaccpps eueueueue      
s.t. 
10  ie     1iu  
Where: 
up = the utility the physical protection subsystem 
uc = the utility the material control subsystem 
ua = the utility the material accounting subsystem 
um = the utility the management subsystem 
The utilities (ui) were determined through the survey of experts and leads to the 
equation used in the effectiveness calculation for this simulation. 
macps eeeee 2905.02660.02666.02578.0   
The simulation will only cover the first layer of subsystems and the utilities of subsystem 
elements will not be used for simplicity.  The simulation will produce error rates based 
on the theoretical rates from Figure 34 and Figure 35.  These theoretical rates 
calculated on the count basis, as seen in Table 12, will be used to calculate both the 
theoretical effectiveness using the posited function and the DOE system performance 
effectiveness equation for comparison.  The simulated data for the longest runs can be 
seen in Table 12. 
 
Five repetitions under each condition were conducted and data saved to an excel file 
and are listed in Table 13.  The conditions were proportional to the Accounting entities 
and were 300, 3000 or 30000 Accounting entities.  The results of the function 
calculations verses both the number of entities and the theoretical value for both the 





Table 12 Theoretical Alarm Rates for Safeguards Simulation 
 A C M P 
Count 30000 30000 15000 18000 
SAlarm2 873.18 873.18 436.59  
AMissed 541.78 541.78 270.89  
SAlarm1 2911 2911 1455 5400 
AT1 291 291 146 540 
AT2 18 18 9 252 
Total System Alarms 3,784  3,784  1,892  5,400  
Total T1 291  291  146  540  






Table 13 Simulated Error Rates 
Entities = Count November 2, 2008 
Variable REP 1 REP 2 REP 3 REP 4 REP 5 
A Count 30,000  30,000  30,000  30,000  30,000  
AAlarm2 809  808  810  873  819  
AMissed 529  573  525  548  560  
ASAlarm1 2,951  2,901  2,892  2,817  2,952  
AT1 307  311  272  309  280  
AT2 16  15  19  18  15  
Total A System Alarms 3,760  3,709  3,702  3,690  3,771  
Total A T1 307  311  272  309  280  
Total A T2 545  588  544  566  575  
C Count 30,000  30,000  30,000  30,000  30,000  
CAlarm2 746  820  781  815  802  
CMissed 491  522  492  507  504  
CSAlarm1 2,829  2,802  3,004  2,939  2,931  
CT1 285  267  317  301  286  
CT2 13  16  14  10  18  
Total C System Alarms 3,575  3,622  3,785  3,754  3,733  
Total C T1 285  267  317  301  286  
Total C T2 504  538  506  517  522  
M Count 15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  
MAlarm2 449  416  437  451  420  
MMissed 270  249  264  282  258  
MSAlarm1 1,397  1,455  1,488  1,405  1,412  
MT1 144  156  148  110  136  
MT2 8  12  8  9  8  
Total M System Alarms 1,846  1,871  1,925  1,856  1,832  
Total M T1 144  156  148  110  136  
Total M T2 278  261  272  291  266  
P Count 18,000  18,000  18,000  18,000  18,000  
PAlarm1 561  535  538  518  509  
PAlarm2 1,255  1,274  1,272  1,242  1,284  
PAlarm3 3,470  3,592  3,464  3,665  3,637  
PP1T1 59  56  60  51  40  
PP2T1 147  130  145  124  132  
PP3T1 353  392  350  375  357  
PPT2 242  232  236  241  248  
Total P System Alarms 5,286  5,401  5,274  5,425  5,430  
Total P T1 559  578  555  550  529  


























1a 1000 8 1 10 11 0 5 16 1 9 6 9 6 0 0 41 33 8 0.4459
1b 1000 7 1 7 12 0 8 12 0 6 12 12 12 0 0 43 33 13 0.3947
1c 1000 8 0 9 10 1 5 17 0 13 6 7 6 0 0 41 34 7 0.4533
2a 10000 87 2 93 112 1 88 106 2 87 117 79 115 1 0 422 347 121 0.3914
2b 10000 87 2 100 86 0 90 110 2 89 84 100 82 0 0 367 379 86 0.3767
2c 10000 94 2 78 116 0 85 107 3 113 101 101 100 1 0 418 377 106 0.3925
3a 100000 1006 10 1013 932 4 992 999 12 971 1043 981 1030 14 0 3980 3957 1070 0.3666
3b 100000 1014 9 1028 972 9 1022 1017 11 926 998 989 983 3 0 4001 3965 1015 0.3748
3c 100000 963 7 981 1026 7 959 1019 12 968 1021 995 1006 6 0 4029 3903 1038 0.3771
Theoretical 100000 1000 10 990 990.1 9.901 980.199 990.1 9.901 980.199 990.1 980.199 990 9.901 9.901 3970.3 3940.498 1029.7 0.3717
Theoretical 300 300 0.3717
Theoretical 1000 1000 0.3717
Theoretical 3000 3000 0.3717
Theoretical 10000 10000 0.3717
Theoretical 30000 30000 0.3717
Theoretical 100000 100000 0.3717
































P Entities A Alarms AT1 AT2 A e s C Alarms CT1 CT2 C e s M Alarms MT1 MT2 M e s P Alarms PT1 PT2 P es
Simulation 
Effectiveness
1a 300 300 150 180 40 1 3 0.9297 33 1 5 0.8678 22 2 5 0.8103 53 3 5 0.9113 0.8834
1b 300 300 150 180 33 5 2 0.9236 36 0 5 0.8780 18 2 3 0.8494 55 9 5 0.8960 0.8887
1c 300 300 150 180 38 1 8 0.8257 36 4 5 0.8697 17 2 1 0.9328 63 9 6 0.8975 0.8783
1d 300 300 150 180 28 1 9 0.7562 46 4 9 0.8319 23 1 5 0.8204 49 6 5 0.8962 0.8259
1e 300 300 150 180 43 6 9 0.8159 37 3 10 0.7840 21 3 1 0.9368 58 3 3 0.9485 0.8668
2a 3000 3000 1500 1800 381 37 50 0.8775 359 28 46 0.8822 200 10 27 0.8793 525 47 29 0.9408 0.8954
2b 3000 3000 1500 1800 361 29 47 0.8803 346 14 49 0.8748 164 12 28 0.8508 553 60 31 0.9369 0.8872
2c 3000 3000 1500 1800 397 24 64 0.8588 362 37 50 0.8716 171 14 39 0.8107 549 55 24 0.9493 0.8754
2d 3000 3000 1500 1800 362 24 62 0.8510 349 24 49 0.8737 208 14 33 0.8602 536 57 27 0.9423 0.8824
2e 3000 3000 1500 1800 412 39 58 0.8706 358 25 66 0.8414 191 16 33 0.8483 542 54 34 0.9327 0.8741
3a 30000 30000 15000 18000 3760 307 545 0.8690 3575 285 504 0.8722 1846 144 278 0.8651 5286 559 301 0.9367 0.8864
3b 30000 30000 15000 18000 3709 311 588 0.8586 3622 267 538 0.8671 1871 156 261 0.8729 5401 578 288 0.9396 0.8847
3c 30000 30000 15000 18000 3702 272 544 0.8683 3785 317 506 0.8773 1925 148 272 0.8722 5274 555 296 0.9375 0.8893
3d 30000 30000 15000 18000 3690 309 566 0.8624 3754 301 517 0.8746 1856 110 291 0.8622 5425 550 292 0.9401 0.8856
3e 30000 30000 15000 18000 3771 280 575 0.8641 3733 286 522 0.8734 1832 136 266 0.8695 5430 529 288 0.9415 0.8876
r = 2 u a  = 0.2660 u c  = 0.2666 u m  = 0.2095 u p  = 0.2578
Theoretical 30000 30000 15000 18000 3784 291 560 0.8673 3784 291 560 0.8673 1892 146 280 0.8673 5400 540 252 0.9467 0.8876
3784 291 560 0.8712 3784 291 560 0.8712 1892 146 280 0.8712 5400 540 252 0.9554 0.8928
Theoretical 30 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.8876
Theoretical 300 3000 3000 3000 3000 0.8876
Theoretical 3000 10000 10000 10000 10000 0.8876
Theoretical 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 0.8876
Theoretical 50000 100000 100000 100000 100000 0.8876
DOE System Performance Effectiveness Equation PE=PD






10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
300 5 reps 3000 5 reps 30000 5 reps Theoretical
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seen, the simulation values show convergence to a theoretical value which indicates 
simulation validity.  The converged and theoretical values show agreement with DOE 
probabilistic method which again shows calculation validity. 
4.5 Verifying The Results 
The verification of the survey results can be seen in Table 8 that shows the mean 
response from the survey.  A cross check of the table indicating the overall coefficients 
are reasonable can be seen by looking at the difference of the filtered data to the full 
survey data for any given coefficient.  There were only three values that were outside of 
the error bars of the survey indicating very good internal agreement and excellent 
overall agreement between those with greater expertise in a given area verses the 
entire population.  Much of the time the data were not normally distributed and these 
visually showed the responses being closer to the mean than would be expected in a 
normal distribution.  Again this may indicate that the utilities determined in this survey 
had good internal agreement, however larger sample sizes would be required to draw 
this conclusion. 
 
Verifying the airport simulation takes two approaches.  The first is checking for internal 
consistency in the data and as can be seen in Table 11 the “Denied Boarding” value of 
1936 (shaded green) for run 1 with 100,00 travelers does not equal (“Bag Denied” + 
“Computer Denied” + “Metal Denied”) in this case (932 + 999 + 10 = 1941).  This 
indicates that there were some travelers after ID screening which had failed more than 
one of the additional screenings (“Bag Denied” or “Computer Denied” or “Metal Denied”) 
which agrees with the fact that the maximum “Denied” value was 2 (shaded yellow).  
“Denied” was a condition variable used to deny boarding if the value was equal to or  
greater than 1 when any detection was made.  If the value for an entity only reached 1 
then there were no duplicates and thus “Denied Boarding” would equal (“Bag Denied” + 
“Computer Denied” + “Metal Denied”) which was the case. 
 
In further verifying the simulation one needs to look for convergence to a theoretical 
value as the run parameters increase the number of travelers.  Figure 39 and Figure 40 
show convergence of the output for the simulation runs and plots the effectiveness 
calculation verses a theoretical value.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter 5 pulls together the research and summarizes the findings.  The checklists and 
criteria developed during the earlier chapters will be summarized and specifically 
addressed. 
5.1 Summary 
In summarizing this research, recall the MIT definition of effectiveness as “the ratio of 
functions achieved to the totality of functions desired,” [20] which corresponds to the 
goal centered approach, of evaluating system effectiveness which is determined by 
comparing the systems performance against specific objectives. [52]  Under any 
evaluation approach, there will always be interest in improving system effectiveness.   
 
The System Effectiveness Methodology provides an ongoing single measure of 
effectiveness quantification based on system performance for a working system in near 
real-time.  In comparing the two calculation methodologies directly the following can be 
summarized: 
 
The DOE Protection Effectiveness Model 
With the overall activity described by DOE Vulnerability Assessment (VA) 
Requirements which include the description of the physical and operational 
characteristics of a safeguards and security (S&S) system, assigning values such as 
delay and detection, and analyzing the results to determine the relative effectiveness 
in conjunction with the adversary‟s capabilities as identified in the Design Basis 
Threat (DBT). [17]   
• Accounts only for sequential attack (analysis may include other modes – 
insider threat) 
• Requires VA practitioners must be specifically trained for VAs 
• Requires that Initial Surveys be comprehensive 
• Repeats with periodic surveys usually every 12 months 
• Requires VA teams to be led by a Federal employee (likely has 5 technical 
specialists working up to 12 months initially and 3 weeks annually 
thereafter)[65] 
The Heuristic System Effectiveness Model 
• Accounts for non linear attack (Insider Threat) 
• Can be created to provide error data automatically 
• Provides near real time quantification of system performance 
• Routine values can be complied and reported by a single statistician with a 




Therefore, the Heuristic System Effectiveness Model, is more robust than and 
compliments the DOE Protection Effectiveness Model 
 
 
Are (1- x) and (1- y) [ in this case (1-a and (1-bMoEs ? 
Using the definition of Smith and Clark [28], Do the MoEs) should:  
1. Increase as effectiveness increases; 
Yes (error rate decreases) 
2. Be bounded above by an ideal system and below by zero for non-compliance;  
Yes (performance rates (1-a and (1-b range from 0 to 1) 
3. Manage complexity and allow for system decomposition,  
Yes (error rates for decomposed system elements used) 
4. Facilitate comparisons between systems it is necessary to normalize the final 
effectiveness scores.  
Yes The range chosen (with 0 denoting an ineffective system and 1 denoting a 
perfectly effective “ideal” system) allows similar systems to be compared 
5. Should be ratio scales which means that they have a natural zero point and numbers 
which are multiples of each other directly indicate their value.  
Yes.  The measures are modified ratio scales in that a system that performs 
correctly (1-a, or 1-b) 80% of the time has performed correctly twice as many 
times as a system that performs correctly 40% of the time or is discounted based 
on the known tolerance for  or  . 
Therefore the selected measures are suitable MoEs. 
 
 
Does the methodology?: 
 Provide a clear definition of a system and system effectiveness that is broad across 
many applications?; 
The definitions are accepted by the community and the effectiveness has been show to 
be robust.   
 That it complements the probabilistic approach (DOE approach of PE);  
The PE approach is used by the DOE in the design phase and for periodic evaluations.  
The es approach is used for a near real-time assessment. 
 Add to the open literature concerning systems effectiveness measurement?; 
The methodology, simulations, and survey have been presented in open forums and 
included in the proceedings.[67] [71] [73] [74] 
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 Recognize the complexities of system structures? 
Decomposition and aggregation of system components are built into the methodology 
 
Therefore the Goals of the system effectiveness methodology are met. 
 
 
Are the Hypotheses Affirmed? 
 
When looking at the hypotheses and the checklists developed for each in Chapter 3 the 
hypotheses can be addressed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) methodology is a valid 
approach to incorporate safeguards measures of effectiveness at the component-
subsystem level and assess them at the safeguards system level.  
 
1. Is the proposed solution a Methodology? 
 The system effectiveness equation developed and applied with the MAUT is a 
methodology as a body of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a 
discipline; [5] and a specific set of directions to a specific location. [6] 
2. Are the selected inputs measures of effectiveness? 
Using the error rates to determine the correct performance inputs used in the system 
effectiveness function, i.e. [(1-a) and (1-b)] are MoEs based on Smith and Clark 
[28] criteria 
a. The measures increase as effectiveness increases; 
b. The measures are bounded above by an ideal system and bounded below by 
zero for non-compliance;  
c. The measures plus MAUT allow for complexity and allow for system 
decomposition, and aggregation. 
d. The measures are normalized with the range [20] chosen (with 0 denoting an 
ineffective system and 1 denoting a perfectly effective “ideal” system)  
e. Are ratio scales which means that they have a natural zero point and 
numbers which are multiples of each other directly indicate their value.  
3. Can the measures of effectiveness be aggregated at the subsystem/component 
level to produce an overall effectiveness measure? 
 The system effectiveness equation has built in the capability to decompose to 
a level where the MoE can be measured and then aggregated to produce a 
single measure. 
4. Can the methodology be compared to a validated methodology? 
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 The methodology is validated based on comparison to the probabilistic 
methodology used by the DOE and found to be complimentary but more 
conservative in that a wider range of attacks are allowed.  When a single 
layer system is compared using data from simulations for the two 
methodologies they result in the same value as the tolerance for false alarms 
is raised to infinity. 
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is affirmed. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Calculating safeguards system effectiveness using Type I and Type II 
error rates is a valid modeling approach upon which to base an effectiveness 
methodology with incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and uncertainties 
 
1. Is the system effectiveness methodology robust than the DOE Protection 
Effectiveness Model? 
The system effectiveness equation applied using MAUT (the family of systems 
effectiveness equation), has broader application than the protection effectiveness 
equation used by DOE in that it provides for the non-linear attacks (e.g. insider 
threat) and attacks that don‟t depend on specific scenarios.  This produces a 
more robust measure. 
2. As the level of experience increases how are the heuristics affected? 
During the lifecycle of a system, specifically the operational phase, the amount of 
error rate data increases to improve the overall accuracy of and confidence in the 
MoEs. 
3. What relationship do incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties in the modeling environment have with the heuristics? 
With less or incomplete data the heuristics will garner less confidence until 
operational experience is gained or through specific testing to determine 
performance.  As technologies change creating newer or more accurate methods 
of determining the error rates, the heuristic approach will have greater validity. 
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is affirmed. 
 
 
Regarding the research questions: 
A. “Can a methodology be formulated and used to analyze the effect of incorporating 
measures of effectiveness concepts at the component-subsystem level, yet assess 
them at the system level?”  
As Druzdzel established, by measuring effectiveness and using values between zero 
and one, it is possible to aggregate their effects, that is, given subsystem 
effectiveness total system effectiveness can be determined 
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And thus research question A is answered in the affirmative  
 
B. “Can uncertainties, such as incomplete data, rapidly changing technologies, and 
uncertainties in the modeling environment be addressed through heuristics in a 
system effectiveness methodology?” 
This research shifted from a probabilistic approach that analyzes the likelihood of 
events and determining effectiveness based on those probabilities to a heuristic 
approach which uses the experience of measured error rates on a real-time sample 
(Type I and Type II errors previously mentioned and seen in Table 2).  Heuristics 
have been shown to be highly economical and usually effective. [39]  Dewhurst et. 
al. indicate that research in cognitive psychology indicates that individuals at all 
educational levels use heuristics especially when making a decision within a limited 
amount of time. [40]  In the case of using a measured rate of errors, as in this 
research, the more data gathered over time (producing an increased sample size) 
the more confidence these measures garner.   
 
And thus research question B is answered in the affirmative  
5.2 Conclusions 
A valid and robust methodology for calculating system effectiveness of a subsystem in 
near real time has been developed and examples of use presented with the system 
effectiveness function. 
 
)1()1( ba KKe       
 
Where Ka = (r)
1/c for r > 1 ;  otherwise Ka = 1 
Where Kb = (r)
-1/c for r < 1 ;  otherwise Kb = 1 
 
This allows e to be calculated for any system/subsystem in a dynamic and ongoing 
basis.  When the system is decomposed into subsystems an MAUT methodology is 
applied using the family of systems effectiveness equation. 
 
  iieues  essEffectiven System  
Subject to: 10  ie   1iu   
 
The example of a domestic safeguards system illustrates the full methodology in use 
and shows that the system can be decomposed to the level of subsystems to the extent 




Once a baseline for a specific system is measured, comparisons over time will allow an 
ongoing and consistent effectiveness evaluation. 
 
Should conditions (c = consequence/stress factor) change the system assumptions can 
be modified (change the ratio r) to gain acceptable solution space. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
The system effectiveness equation and MAUT methodology offer a repeatable and 
quantifiable application in evaluating generic system effectiveness and in particular 
within the domestic safeguards community.  In this specific instance, the 
subcomponents need refinement.  The survey instrument could easily be revised based 
on this experience and be repeated at the next (or any subsequent) INMM Annual 
Meeting.  Once the survey instrument is refined and attendees are familiar with the 
concept and time requirements for taking the survey, a greater proportion of the 
population would likely respond leading to a smaller error band in the results.   
 
For each individual system, the definition and decomposition of the system components 
is the key to the applicability to the real world.  Once a system manager has determined 
the worth of the methodology, the utilities need to be developed based on manager 
and/or expert input, thus yielding a valid method for an ongoing evaluation of any given 
system‟s effectiveness.   
 
This work opens an area of research that allows the consistent ongoing evaluation of a 
given systems effectiveness.  The subsystems are defined and error rates measured 
giving a significantly increased quantification and consistency in system effectiveness 
determinations.  Methodologies for determining the parameters r and c need to be 
developed as guidance for the system manager. 
 
Specific areas of potential future work to apply this system effectiveness methodology 
could include inter alia such areas as the medical field, quality assurance (QA) 
applications, and justice system evaluations.  In each of these cases measuring the 
rates of error are much more accessible.  In particular the missed alarm () rate would 
have a much more direct measurement.  In the case of the medical field testing for 
presence of a particular disease would have a direct measurement of false positives 
and false negatives.  In the area of QA processes for determining quality could be 
judged again based on and  rates.  In the justice applications false positives against 
individuals might have much lower tolerance than in a number of other applications and 
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Appendix I Safeguards Survey 
This appendix contains a printout of the final survey tool with all questions in the order 
given.  The respondent was asked to rate subsystem components in all areas however 
the data was filtered in some of the analyses  to those with greater than 5 years 
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Appendix II Survey Results 
This Appendix presents the JMP program output for the responses in the Safeguards 
Survey in graphical and Tabular form.  Appendix II is separated into sections.  Section 1 
contains the distributions for the Full Set of respondents.  Section 2 contains the 
distributions for the Plant Management filtered responses.  Section 3 contains the 
Material Control filtered responses.  Section 4 contains Material Accounting filtered 
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Section 1 Full Set of Respondents 
Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Plant Management (PM) Component Ranking 
Personnel Reliability PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1083824 
Std Dev 0.0226318 
Std Err Mean 0.0022409 
upper 95% Mean 0.1128277 






Std Dev 0.0252225 
Std Err Mean 0.0024974 
upper 95% Mean 0.0906502 
lower 95% Mean 0.0807419 
N 102 
 
Knowledge of MPC&A PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1089608 
Std Dev 0.0196745 
Std Err Mean 0.0019481 
upper 95% Mean 0.1128252 
lower 95% Mean 0.1050963 
N 102 
 
System Oversight PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0940294 
Std Dev 0.0224166 
Std Err Mean 0.0022196 
upper 95% Mean 0.0984325 
lower 95% Mean 0.0896264 
N 102 
 
0.02 0.06 0.1 0.14 0.18
0 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.16
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Plant Management (PM) Component Ranking 
System Documentation PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0983137 
Std Dev 0.015442 
Std Err Mean 0.001529 
upper 95% Mean 0.1013468 
lower 95% Mean 0.0952806 
N 102 
 
Configuration Management PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0958922 
Std Dev 0.0192405 
Std Err Mean 0.0019051 
upper 95% Mean 0.0996713 
lower 95% Mean 0.092113 
N 102 
 
Independent Assessment PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0888529 
Std Dev 0.0222472 
Std Err Mean 0.0022028 
upper 95% Mean 0.0932227 
lower 95% Mean 0.0844832 
N 102 
 
Org Communication PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1074706 
Std Dev 0.0196417 
Std Err Mean 0.0019448 
upper 95% Mean 0.1113286 
lower 95% Mean 0.1036126 
N 102 
 
0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Plant Management (PM) Component Ranking 
Org Coordination PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1028333 
Std Dev 0.0146159 
Std Err Mean 0.0014472 
upper 95% Mean 0.1057042 
lower 95% Mean 0.0999625 
N 102 
 
Personnel Training PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1096765 
Std Dev 0.0176198 
Std Err Mean 0.0017446 
upper 95% Mean 0.1131373 
lower 95% Mean 0.1062156 
N 102 
 
Missed Alarms / False Alarms 
 
Mean 13.59902 
Std Dev 18.077887 
Std Err Mean 1.7899775 
upper 95% Mean 17.149854 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Physical Protection (PP) Component Ranking 
System Objectives PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0615098 
Std Dev 0.0107921 
Std Err Mean 0.0010686 
upper 95% Mean 0.0636296 
lower 95% Mean 0.05939 
N 102 
 
Facility Characterization PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0591863 
Std Dev 0.0109406 
Std Err Mean 0.0010833 
upper 95% Mean 0.0613352 
lower 95% Mean 0.0570373 
N 102 
 
Threat Definition PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0612059 
Std Dev 0.0119763 
Std Err Mean 0.0011858 
upper 95% Mean 0.0635583 
lower 95% Mean 0.0588535 
N 102 
 
Target ID PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0623431 
Std Dev 0.0101499 
Std Err Mean 0.001005 
upper 95% Mean 0.0643368 
lower 95% Mean 0.0603495 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Physical Protection (PP) Component Ranking 
Exterior Intrusion Sensors PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0573431 
Std Dev 0.0103402 
Std Err Mean 0.0010238 
upper 95% Mean 0.0593742 
lower 95% Mean 0.0553121 
N 102 
 
Interior Intrusion Sensors PPrank 
 
Mean 0.055451 
Std Dev 0.0114681 
Std Err Mean 0.0011355 
upper 95% Mean 0.0577035 
lower 95% Mean 0.0531984 
N 102 
 
Alarm Assessment PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0605588 
Std Dev 0.0080341 
Std Err Mean 0.0007955 
upper 95% Mean 0.0621369 
lower 95% Mean 0.0589808 
N 102 
 
Access Delay PPrank 
 
Mean 0.058549 
Std Dev 0.0096428 
Std Err Mean 0.0009548 
upper 95% Mean 0.060443 
lower 95% Mean 0.056655 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Physical Protection (PP) Component Ranking 
Secure Comm PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0585098 
Std Dev 0.0078118 
Std Err Mean 0.0007735 
upper 95% Mean 0.0600442 
lower 95% Mean 0.0569754 
N 102 
 
Alarm Response PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0633235 
Std Dev 0.0081825 
Std Err Mean 0.0008102 
upper 95% Mean 0.0649307 
lower 95% Mean 0.0617163 
N 102 
 
Material Control System PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0591863 
Std Dev 0.0098169 
Std Err Mean 0.000972 
upper 95% Mean 0.0611145 
lower 95% Mean 0.0572581 
N 102 
 
PP System Testing PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0575784 
Std Dev 0.0086074 
Std Err Mean 0.0008523 
upper 95% Mean 0.0592691 
lower 95% Mean 0.0558878 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Physical Protection (PP) Component Ranking 
Personnel Reliability PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0602549 
Std Dev 0.0132633 
Std Err Mean 0.0013133 
upper 95% Mean 0.0628601 
lower 95% Mean 0.0576497 
N 102 
 
Independent System Assessment PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0524804 
Std Dev 0.0121726 
Std Err Mean 0.0012053 
upper 95% Mean 0.0548713 
lower 95% Mean 0.0500895 
N 102 
 
Vulnerability Assessment PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0598431 
Std Dev 0.0095396 
Std Err Mean 0.0009446 
upper 95% Mean 0.0617169 
lower 95% Mean 0.0579694 
N 102 
 
Internal Guard Force PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0564608 
Std Dev 0.009411 
Std Err Mean 0.0009318 
upper 95% Mean 0.0583093 
lower 95% Mean 0.0546123 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Physical Protection (PP) Component Ranking 
Special Response Teams PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0568824 
Std Dev 0.010461 
Std Err Mean 0.0010358 
upper 95% Mean 0.0589371 
lower 95% Mean 0.0548276 
N 102 
 
Missed Alarms / False Alarms PP 
 
Mean 21.081609 
Std Dev 20.794742 
Std Err Mean 2.2294303 
upper 95% Mean 25.51357 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Control (MC) Component Ranking 
Entry Access Control MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0764118 
Std Dev 0.0142581 
Std Err Mean 0.0014118 
upper 95% Mean 0.0792123 
lower 95% Mean 0.0736112 
N 102 
 
Tamper Indicating MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0702157 
Std Dev 0.0147753 
Std Err Mean 0.001463 
upper 95% Mean 0.0731178 
lower 95% Mean 0.0673135 
N 102 
 
Nuclear Material Portal Monitors MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0712843 
Std Dev 0.0135657 
Std Err Mean 0.0013432 
upper 95% Mean 0.0739489 
lower 95% Mean 0.0686198 
N 102 
 
MC PP MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0733039 
Std Dev 0.0164496 
Std Err Mean 0.0016288 
upper 95% Mean 0.0765349 
lower 95% Mean 0.0700729 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Control (MC) Component Ranking 
MC Procedures MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0717353 
Std Dev 0.0114675 
Std Err Mean 0.0011355 
upper 95% Mean 0.0739877 
lower 95% Mean 0.0694829 
N 102 
 
MC Item Tracking MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0750392 
Std Dev 0.011727 
Std Err Mean 0.0011611 
upper 95% Mean 0.0773426 
lower 95% Mean 0.0727358 
N 102 
 
MC Oversight MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0665294 
Std Dev 0.0132655 
Std Err Mean 0.0013135 
upper 95% Mean 0.069135 
lower 95% Mean 0.0639238 
N 102 
 
MC Surveillance MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0742647 
Std Dev 0.0119396 
Std Err Mean 0.0011822 
upper 95% Mean 0.0766099 
lower 95% Mean 0.0719196 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Control (MC) Component Ranking 
MC Containment MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0769902 
Std Dev 0.0117932 
Std Err Mean 0.0011677 
upper 95% Mean 0.0793066 
lower 95% Mean 0.0746738 
N 102 
 
MC Daily Admin Checks MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0613725 
Std Dev 0.0158557 
Std Err Mean 0.00157 
upper 95% Mean 0.0644869 
lower 95% Mean 0.0582582 
N 102 
 
MC Attribute monitors MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0678529 
Std Dev 0.0146331 
Std Err Mean 0.0014489 
upper 95% Mean 0.0707271 
lower 95% Mean 0.0649787 
N 102 
 
MC Process Control MCrank 
 
Mean 0.072951 
Std Dev 0.013562 
Std Err Mean 0.0013428 
upper 95% Mean 0.0756148 
lower 95% Mean 0.0702871 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Control (MC) Component Ranking 
MC Waste Monitoring MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0695882 
Std Dev 0.0132787 
Std Err Mean 0.0013148 
upper 95% Mean 0.0721964 
lower 95% Mean 0.0669801 
N 102 
 
MC Storage Monitoring MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0722745 
Std Dev 0.0128211 
Std Err Mean 0.0012695 
upper 95% Mean 0.0747928 
lower 95% Mean 0.0697562 
N 102 
 
Missed Alarms / False Alarms 3 
 
Mean 16.520588 
Std Dev 19.454992 
Std Err Mean 1.9263312 
upper 95% Mean 20.341911 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Accounting (MA) Component Ranking 
Accounting System MArank 
 
Mean 0.0747549 
Std Dev 0.0117688 
Std Err Mean 0.0011653 
upper 95% Mean 0.0770665 
lower 95% Mean 0.0724433 
N 102 
 
Physical inventory MArank 
 
Mean 0.0715098 
Std Dev 0.0121098 
Std Err Mean 0.0011991 
upper 95% Mean 0.0738884 
lower 95% Mean 0.0691312 
N 102 
 
Measurement Accuracy MArank 
 
Mean 0.0716863 
Std Dev 0.0088999 
Std Err Mean 0.0008812 
upper 95% Mean 0.0734344 
lower 95% Mean 0.0699382 
N 102 
 
Material Transfer Monitoring MArank 
 
Mean 0.0700588 
Std Dev 0.0097115 
Std Err Mean 0.0009616 
upper 95% Mean 0.0719663 
lower 95% Mean 0.0681513 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Accounting (MA) Component Ranking 
Real Time Accounting MArank 
 
Mean 0.0625294 
Std Dev 0.0142104 
Std Err Mean 0.001407 
upper 95% Mean 0.0653206 
lower 95% Mean 0.0597382 
N 102 
 
Measurement Control MArank 
 
Mean 0.068451 
Std Dev 0.0076865 
Std Err Mean 0.0007611 
upper 95% Mean 0.0699607 






Std Dev 0.011521 
Std Err Mean 0.0011407 
upper 95% Mean 0.0602629 
lower 95% Mean 0.0557371 
N 102 
 
Anomaly Detection MArank 
 
Mean 0.0695098 
Std Dev 0.0138584 
Std Err Mean 0.0013722 
upper 95% Mean 0.0722318 
lower 95% Mean 0.0667878 
N 102 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Accounting (MA) Component Ranking 
Inventory Detection and Resolution MArank 
 
Mean 0.0704706 
Std Dev 0.0137263 
Std Err Mean 0.0013591 
upper 95% Mean 0.0731667 
lower 95% Mean 0.0677745 
N 102 
 
Shipper Receiver Difference MArank 
 
Mean 0.0704118 
Std Dev 0.0098175 
Std Err Mean 0.0009721 
upper 95% Mean 0.0723401 
lower 95% Mean 0.0684834 
N 102 
 
MA Process Monitoring MArank 
 
Mean 0.0647647 
Std Dev 0.0103686 
Std Err Mean 0.0010266 
upper 95% Mean 0.0668013 
lower 95% Mean 0.0627281 
N 102 
 
MA Statistical Evaluation MArank 
 
Mean 0.065 
Std Dev 0.0111008 
Std Err Mean 0.0010991 
upper 95% Mean 0.0671804 
lower 95% Mean 0.0628196 
N 102 
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12




Appendix II Survey Results 
 128 
Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Material Accounting (MA) Component Ranking 
MA Procedures MArank 
 
Mean 0.064 
Std Dev 0.0099851 
Std Err Mean 0.0009887 
upper 95% Mean 0.0659613 
lower 95% Mean 0.0620387 
N 102 
 
MA Holdup MArank 
 
Mean 0.0609412 
Std Dev 0.012497 
Std Err Mean 0.0012374 
upper 95% Mean 0.0633958 
lower 95% Mean 0.0584865 
N 102 
 
MA Independent Assessment MArank 
 
Mean 0.0581961 
Std Dev 0.0135698 
Std Err Mean 0.0013436 
upper 95% Mean 0.0608614 
lower 95% Mean 0.0555307 
N 102 
 
Missed Alarms / False Alarms MA 
 
Mean 15.932353 
Std Dev 19.041732 
Std Err Mean 1.8854124 
upper 95% Mean 19.672504 
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Full Set of Respondents (102) 
Summary Subsystem Ranking 
Plant Management  SGrank 
 
Mean 0.224098 
Std Dev 0.0472448 
Std Err Mean 0.0046779 
upper 95% Mean 0.2333778 
lower 95% Mean 0.2148183 
N 102 
 
Material Control SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2599902 
Std Dev 0.0215749 
Std Err Mean 0.0021362 
upper 95% Mean 0.2642279 
lower 95% Mean 0.2557525 
N 102 
 
Material Accounting SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2601471 
Std Dev 0.0234573 
Std Err Mean 0.0023226 
upper 95% Mean 0.2647545 
lower 95% Mean 0.2555396 
N 102 
 
Physical Protection SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2556961 
Std Dev 0.0265281 
Std Err Mean 0.0026267 
upper 95% Mean 0.2609067 
lower 95% Mean 0.2504855 
N 102 
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Section 2 Plant Management Filtered Results 
Subsystems and Plant Management Components  
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Plant Management 
Plant Management Years of Experience 
 
Mean 14.4 
Std Dev 7.6885815 
Std Err Mean 1.9851832 
upper 95% Mean 18.657795 






Std Dev 0.0239549 
Std Err Mean 0.0061851 
upper 95% Mean 0.1081325 
lower 95% Mean 0.0816009 
N 15 
 
Personnel Reliability PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0995333 
Std Dev 0.0195626 
Std Err Mean 0.005051 
upper 95% Mean 0.1103667 
lower 95% Mean 0.0886999 
N 15 
 
System Oversight PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0953333 
Std Dev 0.0153048 
Std Err Mean 0.0039517 
upper 95% Mean 0.1038089 
lower 95% Mean 0.0868578 
N 15 
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Subsystems and Plant Management Components  
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Plant Management 
Knowledge of MPC&A PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0989333 
Std Dev 0.0194035 
Std Err Mean 0.00501 
upper 95% Mean 0.1096786 
lower 95% Mean 0.088188 
N 15 
 
Configuration Management PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1009333 
Std Dev 0.0126122 
Std Err Mean 0.0032564 
upper 95% Mean 0.1079177 
lower 95% Mean 0.093949 
N 15 
 
System Documentation PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1006 
Std Dev 0.0128663 
Std Err Mean 0.0033221 
upper 95% Mean 0.1077251 
lower 95% Mean 0.0934749 
N 15 
 
Org Communication PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1140667 
Std Dev 0.0170732 
Std Err Mean 0.0044083 
upper 95% Mean 0.1235215 
lower 95% Mean 0.1046118 
N 15 
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Subsystems and Plant Management Components  
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Plant Management 
Independent Assessment PMRank 
 
Mean 0.0848 
Std Dev 0.0214982 
Std Err Mean 0.0055508 
upper 95% Mean 0.0967053 
lower 95% Mean 0.0728947 
N 15 
 
Personnel Training PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1092667 
Std Dev 0.0096397 
Std Err Mean 0.002489 
upper 95% Mean 0.114605 
lower 95% Mean 0.1039284 
N 15 
 
Org Coordination PMRank 
 
Mean 0.1016 
Std Dev 0.0142267 
Std Err Mean 0.0036733 
upper 95% Mean 0.1094785 
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Subsystems and Plant Management Components  
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Plant Management 
Material Control SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2602 
Std Dev 0.0240511 
Std Err Mean 0.00621 
upper 95% Mean 0.2735191 
lower 95% Mean 0.2468809 
N 15 
 
Plant  Management  SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2067333 
Std Dev 0.0640373 
Std Err Mean 0.0165344 
upper 95% Mean 0.242196 
lower 95% Mean 0.1712706 
N 15 
 
Physical Protection SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2675333 
Std Dev 0.0322288 
Std Err Mean 0.0083214 
upper 95% Mean 0.285381 
lower 95% Mean 0.2496856 
N 15 
 
Material Accounting SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2654 
Std Dev 0.0345436 
Std Err Mean 0.0089191 
upper 95% Mean 0.2845296 
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Section 3 Material Control Filtered Results 
Subsystems and Material Control Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Control 
MC Years of Experience 
 
Mean 17.277778 
Std Dev 8.1857406 
Std Err Mean 1.3642901 
upper 95% Mean 20.047434 
lower 95% Mean 14.508122 
N 36 
 
Tamper Indicating MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0635833 
Std Dev 0.0165622 
Std Err Mean 0.0027604 
upper 95% Mean 0.0691872 
lower 95% Mean 0.0579795 
N 36 
 
Entry Access Control MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0785556 
Std Dev 0.0125298 
Std Err Mean 0.0020883 
upper 95% Mean 0.082795 
lower 95% Mean 0.0743161 
N 36 
 
MC PP MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0761944 
Std Dev 0.0160621 
Std Err Mean 0.002677 
upper 95% Mean 0.0816291 
lower 95% Mean 0.0707598 
N 36 
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Subsystems and Material Control Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Control 
Nuclear Material Portal Monitors MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0734167 
Std Dev 0.01265 
Std Err Mean 0.0021083 
upper 95% Mean 0.0776968 
lower 95% Mean 0.0691365 
N 36 
 
MC Item Tracking MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0744167 
Std Dev 0.0134449 
Std Err Mean 0.0022408 
upper 95% Mean 0.0789658 
lower 95% Mean 0.0698676 
N 36 
 
MC Procedures MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0745 
Std Dev 0.0131138 
Std Err Mean 0.0021856 
upper 95% Mean 0.0789371 
lower 95% Mean 0.0700629 
N 36 
 




Std Dev 0.0117331 
Std Err Mean 0.0019555 
upper 95% Mean 0.076831 
lower 95% Mean 0.0688912 
N 36 
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Subsystems and Material Control Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Control 
MC Oversight MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0664722 
Std Dev 0.0154541 
Std Err Mean 0.0025757 
upper 95% Mean 0.0717011 
lower 95% Mean 0.0612433 
N 36 
 
MC Daily Admin Checks MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0605556 
Std Dev 0.0185679 
Std Err Mean 0.0030947 
upper 95% Mean 0.066838 
lower 95% Mean 0.0542731 
N 36 
 
MC Containment MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0753889 
Std Dev 0.0097491 
Std Err Mean 0.0016248 
upper 95% Mean 0.0786875 
lower 95% Mean 0.0720903 
N 36 
 
MC Process Control MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0731944 
Std Dev 0.0143543 
Std Err Mean 0.0023924 
upper 95% Mean 0.0780513 
lower 95% Mean 0.0683376 
N 36 
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Subsystems and Material Control Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Control 
MC Attribute monitors MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0651389 
Std Dev 0.0163588 
Std Err Mean 0.0027265 
upper 95% Mean 0.0706739 
lower 95% Mean 0.0596039 
N 36 
 
MC Storage Monitoring MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0746667 
Std Dev 0.0122147 
Std Err Mean 0.0020358 
upper 95% Mean 0.0787995 
lower 95% Mean 0.0705338 
N 36 
 
MC Waste Monitoring MCrank 
 
Mean 0.0704167 
Std Dev 0.0141973 
Std Err Mean 0.0023662 
upper 95% Mean 0.0752204 
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Subsystems and Material Control Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Control 
Plant Management  SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2121944 
Std Dev 0.0544677 
Std Err Mean 0.009078 
upper 95% Mean 0.2306237 
lower 95% Mean 0.1937652 
N 36 
 
Material Control SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2631667 
Std Dev 0.0261233 
Std Err Mean 0.0043539 
upper 95% Mean 0.2720055 
lower 95% Mean 0.2543278 
N 36 
 
Material Accounting SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2676944 
Std Dev 0.0236387 
Std Err Mean 0.0039398 
upper 95% Mean 0.2756926 
lower 95% Mean 0.2596962 
N 36 
 
Physical Protection SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2569167 
Std Dev 0.0288596 
Std Err Mean 0.0048099 
upper 95% Mean 0.2666814 
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Section 4 Material Accounting Filtered Results 
 
Subsystems and Material Accounting Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Accounting 
MA Years of Experience 
 
Mean 19.282051 
Std Dev 9.1621324 
Std Err Mean 1.4671153 
upper 95% Mean 22.252071 
lower 95% Mean 16.312032 
N 39 
 
Accounting System MArank 
 
Mean 0.0768462 
Std Dev 0.0100487 
Std Err Mean 0.0016091 
upper 95% Mean 0.0801036 
lower 95% Mean 0.0735888 
N 39 
 
Physical inventory MArank 
 
Mean 0.0743333 
Std Dev 0.0084428 
Std Err Mean 0.0013519 
upper 95% Mean 0.0770702 
lower 95% Mean 0.0715965 
N 39 
 
Measurement Accuracy MArank 
 
Mean 0.0738974 
Std Dev 0.0075142 
Std Err Mean 0.0012032 
upper 95% Mean 0.0763333 
lower 95% Mean 0.0714616 
N 39 
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Subsystems and Material Accounting Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Accounting 
Material Transfer Monitoring MArank 
 
Mean 0.0698974 
Std Dev 0.007337 
Std Err Mean 0.0011749 
upper 95% Mean 0.0722758 
lower 95% Mean 0.0675191 
N 39 
 
Real Time Accounting MArank 
 
Mean 0.0581795 
Std Dev 0.0175287 
Std Err Mean 0.0028068 
upper 95% Mean 0.0638616 
lower 95% Mean 0.0524973 
N 39 
 
Measurement Control MArank 
 
Mean 0.0691538 
Std Dev 0.0074782 
Std Err Mean 0.0011975 
upper 95% Mean 0.071578 






Std Dev 0.0129462 
Std Err Mean 0.0020731 
upper 95% Mean 0.060171 
lower 95% Mean 0.0517777 
N 39 
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Subsystems and Material Accounting Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Accounting 
Anomaly Detection MArank 
 
Mean 0.0694872 
Std Dev 0.0093383 
Std Err Mean 0.0014953 
upper 95% Mean 0.0725143 
lower 95% Mean 0.0664601 
N 39 
 
Inventory Detection and resolution MArank 
 
Mean 0.072 
Std Dev 0.0075044 
Std Err Mean 0.0012017 
upper 95% Mean 0.0744326 
lower 95% Mean 0.0695674 
N 39 
 
Shipper Receiver Difference MArank 
 
Mean 0.0684359 
Std Dev 0.0091473 
Std Err Mean 0.0014647 
upper 95% Mean 0.0714011 
lower 95% Mean 0.0654707 
N 39 
 
MA Process Monitoring MArank 
 
Mean 0.0618718 
Std Dev 0.0110696 
Std Err Mean 0.0017726 
upper 95% Mean 0.0654601 
lower 95% Mean 0.0582834 
N 39 
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Subsystems and Material Accounting Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Accounting 
MA Statistical Evaluation MArank 
 
Mean 0.0670513 
Std Dev 0.0108748 
Std Err Mean 0.0017414 
upper 95% Mean 0.0705765 
lower 95% Mean 0.0635261 
N 39 
 
MA Procedures MArank 
 
Mean 0.064 
Std Dev 0.0103084 
Std Err Mean 0.0016507 
upper 95% Mean 0.0673416 
lower 95% Mean 0.0606584 
N 39 
 
MA Holdup MArank 
 
Mean 0.0617436 
Std Dev 0.0116703 
Std Err Mean 0.0018687 
upper 95% Mean 0.0655267 
lower 95% Mean 0.0579605 
N 39 
 
MA Independent Assessment MArank 
 
Mean 0.0573077 
Std Dev 0.0151695 
Std Err Mean 0.0024291 
upper 95% Mean 0.0622251 
lower 95% Mean 0.0523903 
N 39 
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Subsystems and Material Accounting Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Material Accounting 
Plant Management  SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2201538 
Std Dev 0.0573395 
Std Err Mean 0.0091817 
upper 95% Mean 0.2387412 
lower 95% Mean 0.2015665 
N 39 
 
Material Control SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2601795 
Std Dev 0.0241551 
Std Err Mean 0.0038679 
upper 95% Mean 0.2680097 
lower 95% Mean 0.2523493 
N 39 
 
Material Accounting SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2625641 
Std Dev 0.0225456 
Std Err Mean 0.0036102 
upper 95% Mean 0.2698725 
lower 95% Mean 0.2552557 
N 39 
 
Physical Protection SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2571538 
Std Dev 0.0269859 
Std Err Mean 0.0043212 
upper 95% Mean 0.2659017 
lower 95% Mean 0.248406 
N 39 
 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.175 0.225 0.25 0.275 0.3
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Section 5 Physical Protection Filtered Results 
Subsystems and Physical Protection Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Physical Protection 
PP Years of Experience 
 
Mean 19.652174 
Std Dev 9.3303449 
Std Err Mean 1.9455114 
upper 95% Mean 23.686918 
lower 95% Mean 15.61743 
N 23 
 
System Objectives PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0614783 
Std Dev 0.0100266 
Std Err Mean 0.0020907 
upper 95% Mean 0.0658141 
lower 95% Mean 0.0571424 
N 23 
 
Facility Characterization PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0620435 
Std Dev 0.0084932 
Std Err Mean 0.001771 
upper 95% Mean 0.0657162 
lower 95% Mean 0.0583707 
N 23 
 
Threat Definition PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0615217 
Std Dev 0.0098667 
Std Err Mean 0.0020573 
upper 95% Mean 0.0657884 
lower 95% Mean 0.0572551 
N 23 
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Subsystems and Physical Protection Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Physical Protection 
Target ID PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0653913 
Std Dev 0.0083161 
Std Err Mean 0.001734 
upper 95% Mean 0.0689875 
lower 95% Mean 0.0617951 
N 23 
 
Exterior Intrusion Sensors PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0572609 
Std Dev 0.0090263 
Std Err Mean 0.0018821 
upper 95% Mean 0.0611641 
lower 95% Mean 0.0533576 
N 23 
 
Interior Intrusion Sensors PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0555217 
Std Dev 0.0094958 
Std Err Mean 0.00198 
upper 95% Mean 0.059628 
lower 95% Mean 0.0514155 
N 23 
 
Alarm Assessment PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0618696 
Std Dev 0.0060925 
Std Err Mean 0.0012704 
upper 95% Mean 0.0645042 
lower 95% Mean 0.059235 
N 23 
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Subsystems and Physical Protection Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Physical Protection 
Access Delay PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0566522 
Std Dev 0.0078196 
Std Err Mean 0.0016305 
upper 95% Mean 0.0600336 
lower 95% Mean 0.0532707 
N 23 
 
Secure Comm PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0572174 
Std Dev 0.0074098 
Std Err Mean 0.0015451 
upper 95% Mean 0.0604216 
lower 95% Mean 0.0540132 
N 23 
 
Alarm Response PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0623478 
Std Dev 0.0037247 
Std Err Mean 0.0007767 
upper 95% Mean 0.0639585 
lower 95% Mean 0.0607371 
N 23 
 
Material Control System PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0590435 
Std Dev 0.0089264 
Std Err Mean 0.0018613 
upper 95% Mean 0.0629035 
lower 95% Mean 0.0551834 
N 23 
 
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
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Subsystems and Physical Protection Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Physical Protection 
PP System Testing PPrank 
 
Mean 0.058913 
Std Dev 0.0085648 
Std Err Mean 0.0017859 
upper 95% Mean 0.0626167 
lower 95% Mean 0.0552093 
N 23 
 
Personnel Reliability PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0582609 
Std Dev 0.0131433 
Std Err Mean 0.0027406 
upper 95% Mean 0.0639445 
lower 95% Mean 0.0525773 
N 23 
 
Independent System Assessment PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0496957 
Std Dev 0.0118338 
Std Err Mean 0.0024675 
upper 95% Mean 0.054813 
lower 95% Mean 0.0445783 
N 23 
 
Vulnerability Assessment PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0608696 
Std Dev 0.0064899 
Std Err Mean 0.0013532 
upper 95% Mean 0.063676 
lower 95% Mean 0.0580631 
N 23 
 
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
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Subsystems and Physical Protection Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Physical Protection 
Internal Guard Force PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0556522 
Std Dev 0.0087158 
Std Err Mean 0.0018174 
upper 95% Mean 0.0594212 
lower 95% Mean 0.0518832 
N 23 
 
Special Response Teams PPrank 
 
Mean 0.0566957 
Std Dev 0.0085729 
Std Err Mean 0.0017876 
upper 95% Mean 0.0604028 
lower 95% Mean 0.0529885 
N 23 
 
Plant Management SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2336522 
Std Dev 0.0319852 
Std Err Mean 0.0066694 
upper 95% Mean 0.2474836 
lower 95% Mean 0.2198207 
N 23 
 
Material Control SGrank 
 
Mean 0.259087 
Std Dev 0.0177634 
Std Err Mean 0.0037039 
upper 95% Mean 0.2667684 
lower 95% Mean 0.2514055 
N 23 
 
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
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Subsystems and Physical Protection Components 
Evaluated By Those With >5 Years Of Experience In Physical Protection 
Material Accounting SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2528261 
Std Dev 0.0242499 
Std Err Mean 0.0050565 
upper 95% Mean 0.2633125 
lower 95% Mean 0.2423396 
N 23 
 
Physical Protection SGrank 
 
Mean 0.2544783 
Std Dev 0.0259403 
Std Err Mean 0.0054089 
upper 95% Mean 0.2656957 
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